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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of two chapters. The first chapter: Dynamic 
reserves in matching markets with contracts. In this paper we study a 
matching problem where agents care not only about the institution 
they are assigned to but also about the contractual terms of their 
assignment so that they have preferences over institution-contractual 
term pairs. Each institution has a target distribution of its slots 
reserved for different contractual terms. If there is less demand for 
some groups of slots, then the institution is given opportunity to 
redistribute unassigned slots over other groups. The choice function 
we construct takes the capacity of each group of seats to be a function 
of number of vacant seats of groups considered earlier. We advocate 
the use of a cumulative offer mechanism (COM) with overall choice 
functions designed for institutions that allow capacity transfer across 
different groups of seats as an allocation rule. In applications such as 
engineering school admissions in India, cadet-branch matching 
problems at the USMA and ROTC where students are ranked 
according to test scores (and for each group of seats, corresponding 
choice functions are induced by them), we show that the COM with a 
monotonic capacity transfer scheme produces stable outcomes, is 
strategy proof, and respect improvements in test scores. Allowing 
capacity redistribution increases efficiency. The outcome of the COM 
with monotone capacity transfer scheme Pareto dominates the 
outcome of the COM with no capacity transfer.  
The second chapter: On relationships between substitutes conditions. 
In the matching with contracts literature, three well-known conditions 
on choice functions (from stronger to weaker)- substitutability, 
unilateral substitutability (US) and bilateral substitutability (BS) have 
proven to be critical. This paper aims to deepen our understanding of 
them by separately axiomatizing the gap between the BS and the other 
two. We first introduce a new “doctor separability” (DS) condition 
and show that BS, DS and irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) are 
equivalent to IRC and US. Due to Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and 
Aygün and Sönmez (2012), it is known that US, “Pareto separability” 
(PS), and IRC are equivalent to substitutability and IRC. This, along 
with our result, implies that BS, DS, PS, and IRC are equivalent to 
substitutability and IRC. All of these results are given without IRC 
whenever hospital choices are induced from preferences.  
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Chapter 1: Dynamic Reserves in Matching Markets
With Contracts: Theory and Applications
May 4, 2015
1 Introduction
Engineering school admissions in India functions through a centralized matching
market in which students with different privileged backgrounds such as caste and
tribes are treated with different admission criteria. Students have different pref-
erences over how they are treated in admission to the same engineering program.
Therefore, students may prefer not to reveal their caste and tribe information in
the application process. Besides this strategic calculation burden on students, the
current system suffers from a crucial market failure: The centralized assignment
mechanism fails to transfer some unfilled seats reserved for under-privileged castes
and tribes to the use of remaining students. Hence, it is vastly wasteful.
In this paper, we propose a remedy to this problem in a new matching model
with contracts and ability to utilize unfilled seats of certain types for other students.
Moreover, our remedy removes strategic manipulation burden from students’ shoul-
ders about for which seat types they should apply at an engineering program. We
propose a strategy proof and stable mechanism in this framework.
There are other direct applications of our model such as USMA and ROTC
cadet-branch matching and assignment procedures in hierarchical firms. We discuss
all three motivating examples in Section 2.
More specifically our model addresses the real-life applications as follows: There
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are institutions and agents to be matched. Each institution initially reserves a certain
number of its slots for different privilege groups (agent types). For a single agent,
there might be more than one possible contract to obtain a slot at a given institution.
Each institution has a pre-specified order (precedence order) in which these different
privilege groups are to be considered. Different institutions might have different
orders. Each agent is a member of at least one privilege group. Since an agent
might have more than one privilege type, the set of agents cannot be partitioned
according to privilege groups. Each agent has a preference over institution-privilege
type pairs. Agents care not only about which institution they are matched to but
also about the contractual terms or privilege type under which they are admitted.
Each institution has a target distribution of its slots over privilege types, but we
do not consider these target distribution as hard bounds.1 If there is less demand
from at least one privilege type institutions are given opportunity to utilize these
vacant seats by transferring them over other privilege groups. Institutions might
have preferences over how to redistribute these unassigned slots. Each institution
has a complete plan where they state how they want to redistribute these slots, so we
take capacity transfers to be exogenous. The only condition imposed on the capacity
transfer scheme is monotonicity2 which requires that if more slots are left unassigned
from one or more privilege types, the capacity of other privilege types is required to
be weakly higher.
The novel design part of this paper is the construction of a choice function of
institutions that allows them to transfer capacities from low-demand privilege types
to high-demand privilege types. Each institution respects an exogenously given
precedence order between different privilege types of student groups when it fills
its slots. For each of the privilege types there is an associated choice function,
we call a sub-choice function. Given the target distribution of the institution and
the set of contracts, the first privilege type (according to its precedence order) of
the institution fills its slots according to its sub-choice function. Then, it moves
1Hard bounds and soft bounds are analyzed in detail in Ehlers et al. (2014).
2This condition is first introduced by Westkamp (2013) in the context of German university
admissions.
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to the second privilege type. Sub-choice functions are linked to each other by two
components. Firstly, since we take a pre-specified precedence order, the choice in
each privilege group depends on what has been chosen by the privileges groups
that were considered earlier according to the precedence order. Given the chosen
contracts from the first privilege type, the remaining set of contracts for the second
privilege type can be found as follows: if an agent has one of her contracts chosen
by the first privilege type, then all of her contracts are removed (rejected) for the
rest of the choice process. The second component that links sub-choice functions of
different privilege types is that the capacity of a privilege type changes dynamically
according to the number of unassigned slots in the privilege types considered earlier
in the choice procedure, i.e., the possible transfer of unassigned slots from privilege
groups to other privilege groups. The idea here is that the capacity of the privilege
type following the first privilege type according to precedence order is a function of
the number of unassigned seats in the first privilege type. The capacity of the third
privilege group is a function of unassigned seats in the first and second privilege
types, and so on. In short, each sub-choice function has two inputs: the set of
remaining contracts to consider, which depends on the choices of the privilege types
considered before it, and its capacity which changes dynamically according to the
number of unassigned slots of the privilege types considered earlier. In this modeling
choice, both of these two inputs of a given sub-choice function depends on the choices
of the sub-choice function of the privilege types preceding it. The overall choice of
an institution is the union of choices by its different privilege types.
In applications, which we describe in part 2, there is a strict ranking of individuals
according to test scores. In the cadet-branch matching problem, cadets are ranked
according to test scores, i.e., the order of merit list. In the school-choice application
from India, students are ranked according to test scores, as well. Then, for each
privilege type, students with that privilege type are ordered, according to the test
score ranking. Choice functions for each privilege type, then, are induced from these
strict rankings. These types of choice functions are common in practice and are
called q-responsive.
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We present the cumulative offer algorithm as an allocation rule with overall
functions of institutions described above. As in Kominers-Sönmez (2013), our overall
choice functions fail to satisfy unilateral substitutability and the law of aggregate
demand.3 Even with this complication, we are able to show that the cumulative offer
mechanism yields stable outcomes, is strategy proof, and respects improvements in
test scores. However, there might not be an agent-optimal stable allocation in our
framework. Moreover, even when an agent-optimal stable allocation does exist, the
cumulative offer mechanism might not find it. The main purpose of introducing
dynamic reserves, i.e., capacity transfers, is to increase efficiency. We show that
the outcome of the cumulative offer process under any monotonic capacity transfer
scheme Pareto dominates the outcome of the cumulative offer mechanism outcome
without a capacity transfer.
2 Motivating Applications
The theoretical framework we develop in this paper has a wide applications in match-
ing problems with distributional concerns. In this section we give three main applica-
tions of our analysis : caste-based affirmative action in engineering school admissions
in India, the cadet-branch matching problem with multiple branch-of-choice contract
possibilities at the USMA and ROTC programs, and firm-worker matching in the
context of hierarchical organization structures.
2.1 Engineering School Admissions in India
Countries in which minority groups have suffered from historic discrimination are
commonly characterized by considerable schooling inequalities between these groups
and the majority of the population. Particularly when the inequality is great, govern-
ments have adopted strong affirmative action policies in higher education to remedy
it, eschewing a voluntary preferential system in favor of a “reservation system” that
reserves a fixed percentage of seats in higher education institutions for the relevant
3These two conditions on choice functions are sufficient for the cumulative offer mechanism to
be strategy proof. See Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and Aygün and Sönmez (2012).
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groups. The fundamental assumption underlying the imposition of a reservation
system is that minority students gain admission into selective programs they would
otherwise not have access to, and such gains generates social return in the near
future.4
India is one of the few countries that practices affirmative action on a large scale.
Reservation in India is the process of setting aside a certain percentage of seats
in government institutions for members of under represented communities defined
primarily by castes and tribes. Reservation is a form of quota-based affirmative
action that is governed by constitutional laws, statutory laws, and local rules and
regulations. Scheduled castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other Backward
Classes (OBC) are the primary beneficiaries of the reservation policies under the
constitution with the objective of ensuring to level the playing field.5
Among all higher education institutions in India, engineering schools are the
most prestigious. The admission procedure in engineering schools is organized and
regulated by the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT). The IIT practices affirmative
action and offers reservation to minority sectors of the society. The following table
shows the reservation structure of engineering schools in the State of Maharashtra.6
Category of Reservation Reservation
Scheduled Castes (SC) 13%
Scheduled Tribes (ST) 7%
Other Backward Classes (OBC) 30%
General Category (including SC, ST and OBC) 50%
As shown in the above table, the reservation system sets aside a proportion of
all possible positions for members of a specific group. Those not belonging to the
designated communities can compete only for general category positions, while mem-
4See Bertrand et al. (2010). They argue that affirmative action successfully targets the finan-
cially disadvantaged in India. The authors find that despite poor entrance exam scores, lower-caste
entrants obtain a positive return for admission.
5For a brief history of affirmative action policies in India, see Bertrand et al. (2010) and Weis-
skopf (2004).
6See “Rules for Admissions to First year of Degree Courses in Engineering/Technology in Gov-
ernment, Govt. Aided and Unaided Engineering institutes in Maharashtra State-Academic year
2014-2015”.
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bers of the designated communities can compete for both reserved seats and open
seats. Students who are not coming from designated communities are considered
only for general category seats. However, a student who belongs to one of the des-
ignated groups is given opportunity to use his or her caste (or tribe) background as
a privilege. If students from designated communities do not use their caste or tribe
privileges they are considered only for general category seats. Claiming a reserved
seat for students from designated communities is optional. If they state their privi-
lege and get accepted to a program with a reserved seat in that category, they have
to prove their membership in the group by providing a legal document.
2.1.1 Engineering School Admission Procedure and the DTEMechanism
In the Maharashtra Engineering school admission procedure, students are ranked
based on their total scores in the “Maharashtra Common Entrance Test (MT CET).”
This ranking is used to assign students to general category seats. Rankings for
privilege types SC, ST, and OBC are derived as follows: For each category, the
relative rankings of the same-category students are preserved and the students from
other categories are removed. For students with the same score, students are ranked
first by their math scores, then by chemistry scores, and finally by physics scores.
In the circumstance that students have the same three scores in each field, age
determines the priority, i.e., the older student is given priority. As such, each student
has a unique ranking. Each student submits his or her preferences over engineering
programs. They can rank at most 100 programs. Together with their program
rankings, they can also submit their privilege type if they are coming from SC, ST,
or OBC communities and want to use this privilege.
The Directorate of Technical Education (DTE), the institution in charge of the
admissions to engineering schools in Maharashtra, uses the following mechanism to
allocate seats to students in the centralized admission process (CAP):
Step 1 : Each student applies to his or her top choice. Each school considers the
applications for the general seat category first, following the ranking . Students
are assigned general category seats one by one following  up to the capacity of
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the general category seats. If there are more students than allowed by the capacity
of the general seat category, the remaining students are considered for the reserved
categories depending on their submitted privilege type. For each reserved category
SC, ST, and OBC, students are assigned seats one by one following the priority order
of privilege type up to the capacity of that category. The remaining students are
rejected.
In general, at step n:
Step n : Each student who was rejected in the previous step applies to his or
her next-choice school. Each school fills its general seats first following  from the
tentatively held students and new applicants. Students are assigned general category
seats one at a time following  up to the capacity of the general category seats. If
there are more students than allowed by the capacity of the general seat category,
the remaining students are considered for the reserved categories depending on their
stated privilege type. For each reserved category SC, ST, and OBC, students are
assigned seats one at a time following the priority ranking in each privilege type up
to the capacity of that category. The remaining students are rejected.
This algorithm ends in finitely many steps. When outcomes are announced, all
students learn their program assignments together with the privilege type under
which they were accepted. DTE announces privilege types together with the pro-
gram assignment for each student to show the public that reservations are actually
respected.
After the above centralized admissions process is done, it there are empty seats in
OBC category these seats are converted into general seats and filled by general cat-
egory applicants according to test score rankings. This process is called “counseling”
process.
2.1.2 The Shortcomings of the DTE mechanism
The mechanism used by the DTE has many shortcomings. Two main problems with
their admission procedure are listed below. The Indian authorities either are not
aware of the first problem or they find it insignificant; however, they realize that the
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second problem is important and are trying to solve it.
(i) Students are asked to state their preferences over the set of programs even
though their assignments specify a program name together with a seat type. The
preference domain is narrower than the allocation domain in that students’ prefer-
ences over seat types are not investigated but are assumed in a specific way. For
example, suppose a student, say from OBC background, submits two schools in his
preference list, school A and school B, such that he prefeers school A to school B.
However, when his assignment is announced, it is going to be in the following form:
“general category seat from school B” or “OBC category seat from school A.” The
DTE assignment procedure simply assumes that students only care about which
program they are admitted to. They assume that for each program a student ranks
in his or her preference list, he or she prefers the open category seat type of that
program over the reserved type seat if the student submitted any privilege along
with his application. However, for several reasons, which we will discuss below, stu-
dents may actually care about what type of seats they receive together with their
program assignments. Their true preferences might be over program name-seat type
pairs, not just program names. Similar to the problem of narrower preference do-
main explained in the cadet-branch matching papers of Switzer and Sönmez (2013)
and Sönmez (2013), the DTE assumes each student prefers the general seats over the
reserved seats given a program. Hence, given a preference relation over schools, the
DTE generates a new preference profile such that the relative ranking of schools is
the same, and in each school the general seat is preferred over the reserved category
seat for every student. However, across different programs with different types of
seats, students might have more complicated preferences.
• Some students might not want to reveal their caste and tribe information and
hence would prefer general category seats over type-specific seats. One of the
main reasons for this is the fact that students who obtain a seat from a re-
served category are discriminated against in some universities. Opponents of
the reservation policies in India argue that the policy is anti-meritocracy and
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decreases the average quality of Indian engineering schools. As a result, many
students who obtain reserved seats feel discriminated against, as the following
item illustrates:
“A survey among first year students (2013-14 batch) belonging to various SC,
ST and OBC categories, has revealed that an alarming 56% of them feel dis-
criminated against in the institution, albeit in a discreet manner. Nearly 60%
of those in the reserved category also said they experienced more academic pres-
sure than those in the general category.”7
Because of this pressure, some SC, ST and OBC students prefers general cate-
gory seats rather than reserved category seat for personal reasons such as pride
and dignity.8 However, current mechanism in use does not let students express
these concerns in their preferences.
• If a student from a designated community uses her privilege and is assigned to
a reserved seat, then she is exempt from school fees (or pay very low fee), will
receive book grants, and will be able to live for free in college housing. Because
of financial reasons a high-score, poor student from a designated community
would prefer a reserved seat over a general seat. This point is illustrated in
the following quote from an online education forum:
“It’s estimated that 70% of Below Poverty Line in India comprises of Scheduled
caste people. It’s very difficult for an SC/ST/OBC student to crack JEE ad-
vanced and once they crack this exam, they have to face even a bigger problem.
How will they afford at least 1.20 lakh Rupees per year for this technical edu-
cation? I mean come on, this comprises only of tuition and hostel fee. What
about other expenses? I think at least 40,000 rs would be enough in minimal
living condition. So a total of 1.6 lakh rs per year. Oh, did we include the cost
of a laptop, a bicycle and food? No. So what we conclude from all this is that
it’s not an easy task for reserved category students to get education in IITs.
7http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report-caste-discrimination-in-india-s-elite-institutions-
students-2016745
8http://www.quora.com/How-does-it-feel-to-be-an-SC-ST-category-student-in-IIT
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I do agree that there are some reserved category students who take advantage
of all this. I guess at least 30% of reserved category students are economically
well and they can afford all this on their own. This is a flaw in the system and
we have to accept it.”9
• General category seats are regarded as more prestigious. Students from des-
ignated communities who care about obtaining prestigious seats have more
complicated preferences than simple preferences only over programs. Also,
some give political reasons for arguing against the reservation policy. Many
students from designated communities are agains caste-based reservation pol-
icy and do not claim caste or tribe privileges. In that case, they are considered
for only general seats.
Example 1. Suppose that student i who has privilege ST submits the following
preference over schools: s1Pis2Pis3. The DTE generates the following preference
relation from the stated preference: sGen1 PisST1 PisGen2 PisST2 PisGen3 PisST3 . However,
student i’s true preference might be as follows: sGen1 PisGen2 PisGen3 PisST1 PisST2 PisST3 .
This student can manipulate the DTE mechanism by misrepresenting her pref-
erences. Also, the mechanism may create an adverse incentive to have lower test
scores if a student from a designated category wants to gain admission only through
reserved category seats; i.e., in the above example, a student from ST community
might have the following true preference: sST1 PisST2 PisST3 PisGen1 PisGen2 PisGen3 .
As such, it is obvious that the DTE mechanism is not fair, does not respect improve-
ments, and is manipulable. Furthermore, it is actually very easy to manipulate the
DTE-mechanism. In our model, we expand the preference domain to program-seat
type pairs to fully alleviate this problem. Every preference profile over only schools
can be represented when preferences are defined over program type-seat type pairs.
The second problem regarding the DTE mechanism is that every year, many
reserved seats remain vacant and the public (especially general category applicants)
react negatively to this fact.
9http://www.quora.com/Reservation-in-India/As-per-the-policy-of-my-institute-IIT-Roorkee-
SC-ST-students-are-provided-with-concession-and-waiver-in-fee-irrespective-of-their-family-income
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(ii) The capacities of reserved seats in the SC and ST categories are taken to
be hard bounds. In other words, if there are not enough applications for one of the
privilege types SC or ST, some of the seats will remain empty. In Maharashtra, the
data show that most years applications from ST students have been low. Hence,
some reserved seats for the ST students have remained vacant.10 However, if there is
any vacant seat from the OBC category, the DTE converts that seat into a general
category seat.11 Also, the number of applications from designated communities is
volatile over time. Due to insufficient demand from some of these communities, every
year many seats that are reserved for SC and ST students remains vacant :
“As admissions to engineering colleges across the state closed, seats in
some of the finest institutes that charge almost nothing have gone abeg-
ging. Not only are seats open in some of the most prestigious colleges of
the state, slots are vacant in some of the top streams too: 69 in electron-
ics, 38 in mechanical engineering, 27 in civil engineering, 23 in computer
science and 10 in electrical engineering. The Directorate of Technical Ed-
ucation (DTE) on Thursday kickstarted the special admission round to
fill vacant seats in government institutes; 269 seats are yet to be filled.”12
In our model, we introduce dynamic reserves such that capacity can be transferred
from one group of seats to another. Allowing capacity transfer increases efficiency
by utilizing slots that would otherwise remain vacant.
2.2 Cadet-Branch Matching Problem
Motivated by the low retention rates of the US Military Academy (USMA) and Re-
served Officer Training Corps (ROTC) graduates, the army introduced an incentive
program in which cadets could bid three years of additional service obligation to
obtain higher priority for their desired branches. The full potential of this incen-
10See Weisskopf (2004). See also Bertrand et al. (2010).
11For the details of the admission procedure for engineering schools, see Weisskopf (2004), Kochar
(2009), and Bertrand et al. (2010).
12http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Prestigious-government-engineering-
colleges-still-have-vacant-seats/articleshow/39833944.cms
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tive program is not utilized, however, because of the USMA’s and ROTC’s deficient
matching mechanism. Switzer and Sönmez (2013) propose a design that eliminates
the mechanism’s shortcomings and mitigates several policy problems the Army has
identified.
The Officer Career Satisfaction Program (OCSF) was designed by a group of
economists and officers at West Point’s Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis
to boost career satisfaction and retention. According to this program, cadets are
given the opportunity to obtain higher priority for branches that they will sign
branch-of-choice contracts with in exchange for serving an additional three years of
active duty, which is normally five years if a cadet does not sign a branch-of-choice
contact. In this setup, two different contractual terms are possible to obtain a seat
from a given branch: the cheap option (five years of active service duty) and the
expensive option (eight years of active service duty). The army reserves certain
slots for cadets who sign branch-of-choice contracts. Cadets at the USMA have a
strict priority ranking known as an order-of-merit-list (OML) that is based on a
weighted average of academic performance, physical fitness test scores, and military
performance. Prior to the implementation of the OCSF, the army had been using
the serial dictatorship induced by the OML to assign slots at 16 branches to cadets.
With the introduction of the OCSF, the army decided to change branch priorities as
follows: For the first 75% of slots at any branch, OML is used, and for the remaining
25% of slots cadets who sign branch-of-choice contracts receive higher priority, while
OML is used to rank them. If the last 25% of the slots cannot be filled, then OML
is used to rank cadets who do not sign a branch-of-choice contract.
One of the problems about the army’s design was that the mechanism they
propose is not a direct mechanism. They ask cadets to choose (i) a ranking of
branches alone, and (ii) a number of branches (possibly none) for which the cadet
is asked to sign a branch-of-choice contract.13 Sönmez and Switzer (2013) carefully
redesign this incentive program for the army as follows: Each cadet is asked to
13Similar to the problem of the engineering school admissions in India, the preference domain is
not large enough to contain all possible preferences even though the outcomes are announced as
branch-contractual terms for each cadet.
12
state his or her preferences over branch-contractual term pairs. They propose to
use a cadet optimal stable mechanism with a specific choice function they designed.
According to their choice function, for the first 75% of slots the contracts with
highest-priority cadets will be chosen one at a time according to OML. If contracts
remain to be considered, for the last 25% of slots first consider contracts with the
expensive option following OLM among them. If there are not enough contracts
with the expensive option to fill the last 25% of slots, fill the remaining slots with
contracts with the cheap option following the OML.
In their choice function design, one should notice that the army reserves 25%
of slots for contracts with the expensive option, but if there is not enough demand
for these slots, they are transferred to the group of slots for contracts with the
cheap option. Consider the following design problem: Suppose that the army offers
more than one branch-of-choice contract possibility in the sense that , say, there are
different types of slots reserved for cadets who want to serve six additional years of
active duty and for cadets who want to serve three years of additional active service
duty (both in exchange of higher priorities at those slots). In our framework, these
different branch-of-choice options correspond to different privilege types and a cadet
might belong to all of them. If the army has a target distribution over these types
of cadets and initially reserves them certain available slots while there is not enough
demand for one of the privilege types, then the army can express its preference over
how to redistribute unassigned slots from the low-demand privilege type over the
others.
2.3 Assignment Procedures in Hierarchical Institutions
Alva (2014) offers an explanation of why hierarchies are a common organizational
structure in institutions from a matching-theoretic perspective, which emphasizes
the significance of stable outcomes for the persistence of organizational structures.
He studies the matching of individual talents via contracts with institutions that
are composed of different divisions enjoined by an institutional governance struc-
ture. The term precedence order in Kominers and Sönmez’s (2013) framework cor-
13
responds to institutional governance structure in Alva’s model. Talents (students
in the school-choice models) have preferences not only over institutions but over
institution-division pairs. Conflicts over contracts between the divisions of an insti-
tution are resolved by a hierarchical (linear) governance structure, whereas conflicts
between divisions across institutions are resolved by the preferences of agents. The
author shows that stable market outcomes exist whenever each institution has a
linear order of its divisions in where, given a set a contracts, divisions choose con-
tracts according to this specified order and the choice of each division is bilaterally
substitutable and satisfies the irrelevance of rejected contracts condition.
In Alva’s model each division within an institution has a pre-specified capacity.
The author takes capacities of divisions to be hard bounds. If there is not enough
demand for a certain division, then some of the available slots in that division will
remain empty. Our main deviation from Alva (2014) is that if there is not enough
demand for some of the divisions we utilize these remaining slots by transferring
them to other divisions. This transfer scheme simply increases efficiency. To be
able to accomplish capacity transfers we introduce choice functions for each division,
where the capacity of a division becomes a function of number of the unassigned
slots of the divisions that fill their slots earlier.
3 The Model
3.1 Agents, Institutions, Contracts, and Privileges
In a matching problem with dynamic reserves, there is a set of agents I = {i1, ..., in},
a set of institutions S = {s1, ..., sm}, a set of privileges Θ = {t1, ...tk}, and a (finite)
set of contracts X = I×S×Θ. Each agent i ∈ I has a set of privileges τ(i) ⊆ Θ he or
she can claim, where τ : I ⇒ Θ is a privilege correspondence. Each contract x ∈ X
is between an agent i(x) ∈ I and an institution s(x) ∈ S, and states the privilege
t(x) ∈ τ(i(x)). We extend the notations i(·), s(·), and t(·) to sets of contracts
by setting i(Y ) ≡ ∪y∈Y {i(y)}, and s(Y ) ≡ ∪y∈Y {s(y)}. For Y ⊆ X, we denote
Yi ≡ {y ∈ Y : i(y) = i}; analogously, we denote Ys ≡ {y ∈ Y : s(y) = s} and
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Yt ≡ {y ∈ Y : t(y) = t}.
Each agent i ∈ I has a (linear) preference order P i (with weak order Ri) over
contracts in Xi = {x ∈ X : i(x) = i}. For ease of notation, we assume that each
i ∈ I also ranks a “null contract” ∅i, which represents remaining unmatched (and
hence is always available), so that we may assume that s ranks all the contracts in
Xi.14 We say that the contracts x ∈ Xi for which ∅iP ix are unacceptable to i. Let
P denote the set of all preferences over S × Θ. A preference profile of agents is
denoted by P = (P i1 , ..., P in) ∈ Pn. A preference profile of all agents except agent
il is denoted by P−il = (P
i1 , ..., P il−1 , P il+1 , ..., P in) ∈ Pn−1.
An allocation X ′ ⊂ X is a set of contracts such that each agent appears in at most
one contract and no institution appears in more contracts than its capacity allows.
Let X denote the set of all allocations. Given an agent i ∈ I and an allocation
X
′ with (i, s, t) ∈ X ′ , we refer to the pair (s, t) as the assignment of agent i under
allocation X ′ . Agent preferences over allocations are induced by their assignments
under these allocations.
Definition 1. (Pareto dominance) Outcome Y ⊆ X Pareto dominates outcome
Z ⊆ X if YiRiZi for all i ∈ I and YiP iZi for at least one i ∈ I.
A mechanism is a strategy space Si for each agent i along with an outcome
function ϕ : (Si1 , ...Sin) −→ X that selects an allocation for each strategy vector
(si1si2 , ..., sin) ∈ Si1 × Si2 × ...× Sin . Given an agent i and a strategy profile s ∈ S,
let s−i denote the strategy of all agents except agent i.
A direct mechanism is a mechanism where the strategy space is the set of prefer-
ences P for each agent i. Hence a direct mechanism is simply a function ψ : Pn −→ X
that selects an allocation for each preference profile.
3.2 Choice Procedure of Schools
Each institution s ∈ S reserves certain parts of its capacity for special agent groups in
order to make some reserved seats available to other privilege types to accommodate
14We use the convention that ∅iP ix if x ∈ X \Xi.
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to the characteristics of applicants. These kinds of constraints are encoded in the
choice procedure of institution s. First of all, each institution pre-specifies a linear
order in which privilege types are considered. We assume that for each s ∈ S, the
privileges are ordered to a (linear) order of precedence Bs. The interpretation of Bs
is that if t Bs t′ then, whenever possible, the slots reserved for agents with privilege
t are filled before the slots reserved for agents with privilege t′ . Note that an agent
might have multiple privileges, so that set of agents I may not be partitioned into
disjoint sets of agents with different privileges. In particular, a given agent may be
considered multiple times by a choice procedure.
Institution s initially has a target distribution of its seats over different groups
of agents with different privileges. Let qs denote the total capacity of institution s.
The number of reserved for agents with privilege tj is denoted by qstj . Then, we have
qs =
∑k
j=1 q
s
tj . Institution s has a strict preference for filling these slots according
to its target distribution. If the target distribution cannot be achieved because too
few agents from one or more of the k privilege groups apply, then institution s can
express its preferences over possible alternative distributions of privilege types by
specifying how its capacity is to be redistributed.
For a given institution s ∈ S, Cs(.) : 2X −→ 2X denotes the overall choice
function of institution s. Without loss of generality, assume that the precedence
order is t1 Bs t2 Bs ... Bs tk. Given a set of contracts Y ⊆ X, Cs(Y ) is determined
as follows:
• Given qst1 and Y = Y 0 ⊆ X, let Y1 ≡ Cst1(Y 0, q¯st1) be the set of chosen contracts
with privilege t1. Then, let r1 = qst1− | Y1 | be the number of unused seats that
were initially reserved for agents with privilege t1. Define Y˜1 ≡ {y ∈ Y : i(y) ∈
i(Y1)}. This is the set of all contracts of agents whose contract is chosen by
the sub-choice function Cst1(·, ·). If a contract of an agent with privilege t1 is
chosen, then all of the contracts naming that agent shall be removed from the
set of available contracts for the rest of the procedure. The set of remaining
contracts is then Y 1 = Y 0 \ Y˜1.
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• Given the set of remaining contracts Y 1 and the capacity qst2 = qst2(r1)≥ q˜st2 ,
let Y2 = Cst2(Y
1, qst2) be the set of chosen contracts with privilege t2, where
the capacity of the group of seats for agents with privilege t2 is the function of
the number of unused seats from the first group. Let r2 = qst2− | Y2 | be the
number of unused seats that were reserved for agents with privilege t2. Define
Y˜2 ≡ {y ∈ Y 1 : i(y) ∈ i(Y 1)}. If a contract of an agent with privilege t2 is
chosen by the sub-choice function Cst2(., .), then all of the contracts belonging
to that agent will be removed from the set of available contracts. Then, the
remaining set of contracts is Y 2 = Y 1 \ Y˜1.
• In general, let Yj = Cstj (Y j−1, qstj ) be the set of chosen contracts with privilege
tj from the set of available contracts Y j−1, where qstj = q
s
tj (r1, ..., rj−1) ≥ q¯stj is
the capacity of the group of seats for agents with privilege tj as a function of
the vector of the number of unused seats (r1, ..., rj−1) that are initially reserved
for agents with privileges t1, ..., tj−1, respectively. Let rj = qstj− | Yj | be the
number of unused seats that were reserved for agents with privilege tj . Define
Y˜j = {y ∈ Y j−1 : i(y) ∈ i(Yj)}. The set of remaining contracts is then
Y j = Y j−1 \ Y˜j .
• Given the set of contracts Y = Y 0 and the capacity qst1 of the group of
seats reserved for agents with privilege t1, which comes first in the precedence
order, we define the overall choice function of institution s as Cs(Y ) =
k⋃
j=1
Cstj (Y
j−1, qstj (r1, ..., rj−1)).
3.3 Stability
An outcome is a set of contracts Y ⊆ X. We follow the Gale and Shapley (1962)
tradition in focusing on match outcomes that are stable in the sense that
• neither agents nor institutions wish to unilaterally walk away from their as-
signments, and
• agents and institutions cannot benefit by recontracting outside of the match.
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Definition 2. We say that an outcome Y is stable if it is
(i) individually rational- Ci(Y ) = Yi for all i ∈ I and Cs(Y ) = Ys for all
s ∈ S, and
(ii) unblocked- there does not exist an institution s ∈ S and blocking set
Z 6= Cs(Y ) such that Z = Cs(Y ∪ Z) and Zi = Ci(Y ∪ Z) for all i ∈ i(Z).
Note that if the first condition fails, then there is either an agent or an institution who
prefers rejecting a contract that involves him/it. If the second condition fails, then
there exists an unselected contract x where not only agent i(x) prefers (s(x), t(x))
over his assignment but also contract x can be selected by institution s(x) given its
composition.
Definition 3. A stable outcome Y ⊆ X that Pareto dominates all other stable
outcomes is called an agent-optimal stable outcome.
3.4 Monotone Capacity Transfers
The idea behind the class of problems we study is that each institution is required
to reserve certain parts of its capacity for different privilege types and may prefer
or be required to make some of these reserved seats available to other privilege
types if its capacity cannot be filled by the first privilege types. Each institution
has a pre-specified order in which different privileges are considered while filling its
slots and also has a target capacity distribution over these privilege groups. If its
target distribution cannot be achieved because too few agents from one or more
privilege types apply, the institution would like to have an alternative distribution
over privilege types. To guarantee the existence of stable matchings along with many
other possibility results under capacity transfers, in our framework we require the
capacity transfer scheme to be monotonic.
Definition 4. A capacity transfer scheme is monotonic, if for all j ∈ {2, ..., k} and
all pairs of sequences (rsr˜s)
j−1
s=1 such that r˜s > rs for all s 6 j − 1, qstj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1) >
qstj (r1, ..., rj−1).
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Monotonicity of capacity transfer scheme requires that whenever weakly more
seats are left unassigned in every privilege type from t1 to tj−1, weakly more seats
should be available for privilege type tj . Notice that no capacity transfer trivially
satisfies this definition, so it is considered a monotonic capacity transfer. If the
reserve structure is defined as hard bounds, then there is no capacity transfer. In
this paper, we propose the control constraints to be interpreted as soft bounds-flexible
capacities rather than hard bounds. For example, transferring all of the unassigned
seats from privilege types (other than general category) that have empty slots to
only general category satisfies the monotonic capacity transfer definition and can be
considered a flexible capacity scheme. Even though transferring all of unassigned
seats from other privilege types to the general category might seem more likely to
occur in real-life merit-based assignment procedures to promote competition among
agents (students), in our framework, the capacity transfer schemes that institutions
can implement are very flexible because different institutions might have different
distributional concerns. As long as the capacity transfer scheme is monotonic, each
institution can express its preferences over different capacity transfers where it prefers
to fill its slots according to its initial target distribution.
3.5 Conditions on Preferences and Choice Functions
Let X be the set of contracts. P(X) = 2X is the power set of X. A choice function
is C : P(X) −→ P(X) such that for every Y ⊆ X, C(Y ) ⊆ Y . We now discuss
the extent to which institutions’ choice functions and sub-choice functions satisfy
the conditions that have been key to previous analyses of matching with contracts
models.
Definition 5. A choice function Cs satisfies substitutability if for all z, z′ ∈ X
and Y ⊆ X, z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {z}) =⇒ z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {z, z′}).
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) introduced this substitutability condition, which
generalizes the earlier gross substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982).
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) also showed that substitutability is sufficient to guar-
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antee the existence of stable outcomes. However, their analysis implicitly assumes
the irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC)15 condition defined below:
Definition 6. Given a set of contracts X, a choice function Cs : 2X −→ 2X satisfies
IRC if ∀Y ⊂ X, ∀z ∈ X \ Y , z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {z}) =⇒ Cs(Y ) = Cs(Y ∪ {z}).
Aygün and Sönmez (2013) show that the substitutability condition together with
the IRC condition assures the existence of a stable allocation.
Choice function substitutability is necessary in the maximal domain sense for
guaranteed existence of stable outcomes in a variety of settings. However, substi-
tutability is not necessary for the guaranteed existence of stable outcomes in settings
where agents have unit demand (Hatfield and Kojima (2008, 2010)). Indeed, as Hat-
field and Kojima (2010) showed, the following condition which is weaker than substi-
tutability, not only suffices for the existence of stable outcomes but also guarantees
that there is no conflict of interest among agents. As in the work of Hatfield and
Milgrom (2005), an irrelevance of rejected contracts condition is implicitly assumed
throughout the work of Hatfield and Kojima (2010).16 In a matching with contracts
framework, the IRC condition is crucial. In a recent study, Afacan (2014) gives an
example in which without assuming the IRC condition, the cumulative offer algo-
rithm (which will be defined in Section 4 and is what we propose an an allocation
mechanism) does not even produce an allocation.
Definition 7. A choice function Cs satisfies unilateral substitutability (US) if
z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {z}) =⇒ z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {z, z′}) for all z, z′ ∈ X and Y ⊆ X for which
i(z) /∈ i(Y ) (i.e., no contracts in Y is associated to agent i(z)).
Unilateral substitutability has been proven to be crucial in market design ap-
plications. The choice functions of branches in the cadet-branch problem (Switzer
and Sönmez (2013) and Sönmez (2013)) do not satisfy substitutability. However,
they do satisfy unilateral substitutability. Unilateral substitutability, together with
the law of aggregate demand, guarantees the existence of an agent-optimal stable
15Alkan (2002) refers to it as “consistency.”
16See Aygün and Sönmez (2012) for details.
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allocation, and under them the agent-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism is
strategy proof. Also, in a recent study, Afacan (2014) shows that the cumulative of-
fer mechanism (which is the main mechanism to be used in matching with contracts
framework and will be defined in Section 4) is both resource and population mono-
tonic whenever the choice functions of institutions satisfy unilateral substitutability
and irrelevance of rejected contracts.
Definition 8. A choice function Cs satisfies bilateral substitutability (BS) if
z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {z}) =⇒ z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {z, z′}) for all z, z′ ∈ X and Y ⊆ X for which
i(z), i(z
′
) /∈ i(Y ).
Bilateral substitutability of a choice function is implied by unilateral substi-
tutability, so it is a weaker condition than US. The BS together with the IRC of
overall choice functions guarantees the existence of a stable allocation in a match-
ing with contracts framework under no capacity transfer. However, BS and IRC
together are weak conditions (even under no capacity transfer) in the sense that
many well-known properties of stable allocations in the standard matching problem
do not carry over to the matching with contracts setting. For instance, the agent-
optimal stable allocation fails to exist. Strengthening BS to US restores most of
these well-known properties.17
The choice functions Cs do satisfy substitutability whenever each agent offers at
most one contract to school s.
Definition 9. A choice function Cs(·) satisfies weak substitutability (WS) if
z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {z}) =⇒ z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {z, z′}) for all z, z′ ∈ X and Y ⊆ X for which
| Y ∪ {z, z′} |=| i(Y ∪ {z, z′} |.
This WS condition, first introduced by Hatfield and Kojima (2008), is in general
necessary (in the maximal domain sense) for the guaranteed existence of stable out-
comes (Proposition 1 of Hatfield and Kojima (2008)). Notice that if every agent has
only one privilege type WS corresponds to substitutability.
17See Afacan and Turhan (2014) for the axiomatization of the gap between US and BS.
21
Definition 10. A choice function Cs(·) satisfies the law of aggregate demand
(LAD) if Y ⊆ Y ′ =⇒ | Cs(Y ) |≤| Cs(Y ′) |.
That is, the size of the chosen set never shrinks as the set of contracts grows
under the law of aggregate demand.18 Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) introduce the
LAD condition in a matching with contracts framework, and it has proven to be
critical. Hatfield and Kojima (2010) show that if choice functions of institutions all
satisfy US and LAD, every agent and institution signs the same number of contracts
at every stable allocation (i.e., the rural hospital theorem holds). Moreover, the
cumulative offer mechanism becomes strategy proof and weakly Pareto efficient for
agents. If institutions do not have preferences that generate their choices, then all of
these results are obtained under the additional IRC condition of Aygün and Sönmez
(2012).
Definition 11. A choice function Cs(·) satisfies quota monotonicity (QM) if for
any q, q′ ∈ Z+ such that q < q′ , for all Y ⊆ X
Cs(Y, q) ⊆ Cs(Y, q′)
| Cs(Y, q′) | − | Cs(Y, q) |≤ q′ − q
Quota monotonicity requires choice functions to satisfy two conditions. First,
given any set of contracts, if there is an increase in the capacity we require the choice
function to select every contract it was choosing before increasing its capacity. It
might choose some additional contracts. Second, if, say, the capacity of a privilege
type is increased by 2, then the difference between the numbers of contracts chosen
after and before the capacity increase cannot exceed 2. Since we allow capacities of
privilege types to change dynamically during the choice procedure by exogenously
given monotonic capacity transfer schemes, quota monotonicity will be a crucial
regulative condition on privileges’ sub-choice functions to obtain positive results.
However, it will be trivially satisfied if the sub-choice functions are derived from
18In a different setting, Alkan (2002) refers to the LAD as “cardinal monotonicity.”
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strict priority rankings induced by test scores in merit-based allocation problems.
3.6 Conditions on Sub-choice Functions for Applications
In the Indian engineering school admission problem and cadet-branch matching prob-
lem in USMA and ROTC, each sub-choice function for a privilege type is induced
from a strict ranking of agents according to test scores. Since each agent (cadet) from
a particular privilege type is acceptable for the privilege types she announces at every
institution (branch), the sub-choice functions of every privilege type is acceptant.
Definition 12. A sub-choice function Cstj (·, q) is q−acceptant if | C(Y ) |= min{q, |
Y |} for every Y ⊆ X. A sub-choice function is acceptant if it is q − acceptant for
some q.
This definition basically says that if the number of applicants is less than the
capacity of the privilege type, every contract (each is associated with a different
student/cadet) must be chosen, and if the number of applicants is more than the
capacity of the privilege type then the capacity must be filled.
The following is the standard responsiveness definition presented in the literature.
Definition 13. (Responsive priorities (Roth, 1985)) The preferences of school s
are responsive with capacity q if (i) for any i, j ∈ I, if {i} s {j}, then for any
I
′ ⊆ I \ {i, j}, I ′ ∪{i} s I ′ ∪{j}, (ii) for any i ∈ I, if {i} s ∅, then for any I ′ ⊆ I
such that | I ′ |< q, I ′ ∪ {i) s I ′ , (iii) ∅ s I ′ for any I ′ ⊆ I with | I ′ |> q.
In our framework, we can state both acceptance and responsiveness in a single
condition following Chambers and Yenmez (2014). Note that each agent (cadet) has
only one contract with a given privilege type in our framework.19 Let  be the strict
ranking of agents according to test scores. For privilege type tj , the priority ranking
associated with it, tj , is obtained from  as follows: for every i, j ∈ I such that
tj ∈ τ(i) = τ(j), i tj j if and only if i  j, and for every k ∈ I such that τ(k) 6= t,
∅ tj k.
19This is not necessarily the case in Kominers and Sönmez (2013). In their slot-specific priorities
setting, an agent may have multiple contracts with a privilege type for a given institution.
23
Definition 14. A sub-choice function Cstj (·, q) of institution s for privilege type tj is
q-responsive if there exists a strict priority orderingtj on the set of contracts naming
privilege type tj , Xtj , and a positive integer q such that for any Y ⊆ (Xs ∩Xtj )
Cstj (Y, q) =
q⋃
i=1
{y∗i }
where y∗i is defined as y
∗
1 = max
Y
tj and, for 2 ≤ i ≤ q, y∗i = max
Y \{y∗1 ,...,y∗i−1}
tj .
Responsiveness and acceptance are both crucial for matching applications where
admissions are merit-based. A sub-choice function Cstj (·, q) is q−responsive if there
is a strict priority ordering over the agents for which the sub-choice function always
selects the highest-ranked available agents. If a school’s sub-choice functions are
q-responsive, then for each privilege type the school acts as if it has preferences
over contracts with a capacity constraint, and the school takes the highest-ranking
students available to that privilege type up to its capacity.
3.7 Respect for Unambiguous Improvements
One of the most important parameters of the Indian engineering school admission
problem and cadet-branch matching problem is the strict ranking of agents according
to test scores. Let  be the strict ranking of students. For each school s ∈ S the
strict ranking of contracts in privilege type tj is obtained from  as follows: x stj y
if and only if i(x)  i(y) and t(x) = t(y) = tj . If tj /∈ τ(i), then ∅s stj x for all
x such that i(x) = i. The choice function for each privilege type is obtained from
these strict rankings, i.e., Cstj (Y, q
s
tj ) = C
s
tj (Y, q
s
tj |stj ), which is q-responsive.
Clearly, a reasonable mechanism would never penalize a student as a result of an
improvement in his standing in the strict ordering according to test scores. Given
two strict rankings of students according to test scores  and ′ , we say that ′ is
an unambiguous improvement for student i over  if
1. the relative ranking between all students except student i remains exactly the
same between  and ′ , although
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2. the standing of student i is strictly better under ′ than under .
Definition 15. A mechanism respects improvements if a student never receives a
strictly worse assignment as a result of an unambiguous improvement of his priority
ranking.20
Violation of this condition may create adverse incentives for some agents to lower
their test scores to obtain a better outcome according to their true preferences, as
in the current application procedure of engineering school admissions in India.21
4 The Cumulative Offer Process
The cumulative offer algorithm, which is the generalization of the agent-proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley, is the central allocation mecha-
nism used in matching with contracts framework. We now introduce the cumulative
offer process for matching with contracts (see Hatfield and Kojima (2010); Hatfield
and Milgrom (2005); Kelso and Crawford (1982)).
Here, we provide an intuitive description of this algorithm; we give a more tech-
nical statement in Appendix A.
Definition 16. In the cumulative offer process, students propose contracts to
schools in a sequence of steps l = 1, 2, ... :
Step 1 : Some student i1 ∈ I proposes his most-preferred contract, x1 ∈ Xi1 .
School s(x1) holds x1 if x1 ∈ Cs(x1)({x1}), and rejects x1 otherwise. Set A2s(x1) =
{x1}, and set A2
s′ = ∅ for each s
′ 6= s(x1); these are the sets of contracts available
to schools at the beginning of Step 2.
Step 2 : Some student i2 ∈ I for whom no contract is currently held by any school
proposes his most-preferred contract that has not yet been rejected, x2 ∈ Xi2 . School
s(x2) holds the contract in Cs(x2)(A2s(x2) ∪ {x2}) and rejects all other contracts in
A2s(x2) ∪ {x2}; schools s
′ 6= s(x2) continue to hold all contracts they held at the end
of Step 1. Set A3s(x2) = A
2
s(x2) ∪ {x2}, and set A3s′ = A2s′ for each s
′ 6= s(x2).
20This property was first formulated by Balinski and Sönmez (1999).
21See Sönmez (2013), where the author discusses how cadets intentionally lower their OML to
obtain better outcomes.
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Step l : Some student il ∈ I for whom no contract is currently held by any
school proposes his most-preferred contract that has not yet been rejected, xl ∈ Xil .
School s(xl) holds the contract in Cs(xl)(Al
s(xl)
∪{xl}) and rejects all other contracts
in Al
s(xl)
∪ {xl}; schools s′ 6= s(xl) continue to hold all contracts they held at the
end of Step l− 1 . Set Al+1
s(xl)
= Al
s(xl)
∪{xl}, and set Al+1
s′
= Al
s
′ for each s
′ 6= s(xl).
If at any time no student is able to propose a new contract, that is, if all students
for whom no contracts are on hold have proposed all contracts they find acceptable,
then the algorithm terminates. The outcome of the cumulative offer process is the
set of contracts held by schools at the end of the last step before termination.
In the cumulative offer process, agents propose contracts sequentially. Schools
accumulate offers, choosing at each step (according to Cs ) a set of contracts to hold
from the set of all previous offers. The process terminates when no agent wishes to
propose a contract.
Remark 1. Note that we do not explicitly specify the order in which students make
proposals. Hirata and Kasuya (2014) show that in the matching with contracts
model, the outcome of the cumulative offer process is order - independent if the
overall choice function of every institution satisfies the bilateral substitutability and
the irrelevance of rejected contracts condition. In our setup, the overall choice func-
tion of every institution satisfies BS and IRC, and hence, the order - independence
result holds for our choice functions.
5 Main Results
We now develop our general theoretical results. Overall choice functions of insti-
tutions were defined in Section 4.2 as the union of choices by sub-choice functions.
Sub-choices are linked by both their choices and the monotonic capacity transfer
scheme. Each sub-choice function has two inputs: the set of remaining (rejected)
contracts by the sub-choice functions that precede it and the capacity of the privi-
lege type as a function of number of unassigned seats from all of the privilege types
considered before it. For overall choice function, to guarantee the existence of stable
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allocation under monotonic capacity transfer schemes, we impose certain conditions
on sub-choice functions. As shown by Aygün and Sönmez (2012) and Aygün and
Sönmez (2013), the IRC condition is needed for the overall choice functions of insti-
tutions to guarantee the existence of stable allocation. To achieve this we require
that every sub-choice function satisfies IRC. Alva (2014) shows that if sub-choice
functions satisfy the BS together with the IRC, then the overall choice function
of institutions satisfies BS and IRC if there are no capacity transfers across differ-
ent privilege types (“divisions” in his terminology). These two conditions are not
enough to obtain an overall choice function that satisfies BS and IRC if we allow
capacity transfers across privilege types. Since sub-choice functions are linked by
their two inputs in our framework, we need to impose further axioms, namely, the
law of aggregate demand and quota monotonicity under monotonic capacity transfer
schemes.
5.1 The Existence of Stable Allocation under Monotonic Capacity
Transfers
To ensure that overall choice functions satisfy IRC, it suffices to impose IRC on
sub-choice functions for any capacity transfer scheme (not necessarily monotonic).
Proposition 1. Suppose that all sub-choice functions satisfy IRC. Then, the overall
choice function satisfies IRC.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Remark 2. For the rest of the paper we always assume that sub-choice functions
satisfy IRC so that the overall choice functions of institutions satisfy it as well.
When each agent has only one contract associated with an institution, then
substitutability becomes identical to weak substitutability (WS). To obtain an overall
choice function that satisfies WS, it suffices for sub-choice functions to satisfy WS,
LAD, and QM.
Proposition 2. Suppose that all sub-choice functions satisfy WS, LAD, and QM.
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If the capacity transfer scheme is monotonic, then the overall choice function also
satisfies WS and IRC.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The following proposition is key to guaranteeing the existence of a stable alloca-
tion. The BS condition on overall choice functions, together with IRC, is sufficient
to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes.
Proposition 3. Suppose that sub-choice functions satisfy BS, LAD, and QM. If the
capacity transfer scheme is monotonic, then the overall choice function satisfies BS
and IRC.
Proof. See Appendix B.
If overall choice functions of institutions satisfy BS and IRC, then by Hatfield
and Kojima (2010) and Aygün and Sönmez (2012), a stable allocation exists.
Theorem 1. Suppose that all sub-choice functions satisfy BS, LAD, and QM. If the
capacity transfer scheme is monotonic then there exists a stable allocation.
Proof. By Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 we know that the overall choice function
of each school satisfies BS and IRC. Then, by the Theorem 1 of Hatfield and Kojima
(2010), together with Theorem 1 of Aygün and Sönmez (2012), the set of stable
outcomes is non-empty.
In the Indian engineering school admission problem and the cadet-branch match-
ing problem, sub-choice functions are derived from strict priority rankings according
to exam scores. These type of sub-choice functions trivially satisfy BS, IRC, LAD,
and QM. By Theorem 1, we have existence of stable allocation under these type of
sub-choice functions. We state it as a corollary below:
Corollary 1. Suppose that all-sub-choice functions are q-responsive. Then, under a
monotonic capacity transfer scheme, there exists a stable allocation.
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5.2 Incentive Issues
Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and Aygün and Sönmez (2012) show that if the over-
all choice functions of institutions satisfy US and LAD, then the cumulative offer
mechanism is (group) strategy proof. Even though US and LAD are sufficient for
strategy-proofness, they are not necessary in some frameworks. Kominers and Sön-
mez (2013) provide a choice function that violates both US and LAD, but even with
this complication they show that the cumulative offer mechanism is strategy-proof
in their slot-specific priorities setup. In our problem, if we set the capacity of each
privilege type equal to 1 and do not allow capacity transfer our problem collapses
to a specific version of the slot-specific priorities model of Kominers and Sönmez
(2013). Notice that in our setting, each agent has only one contract associated with
a certain privilege type of a given institution, whereas in their setting this might not
be the case. Also, in our Indian school choice application and in the cadet-branch
matching framework, each sub-choice function is induced from a strict priority rank-
ing of contracts (also agents since each agent can have at most one contract for a
certain privilege type) that is obtained from a strict ranking of agents according
to test scores. However, some negative results from Kominers and Sönmez (2013)
hold in our model as well. Precisely, examples in the proofs of Proposition 4 and
Proposition 5 are both from Kominers and Sönmez (2013).
As in Kominers and Sönmez (2013), overall choice functions fail to satisfy US in
our setup as well:
Proposition 4. Suppose that sub-choice functions are q-responsive and capacity
transfer scheme is monotonic. The overall choice functions of schools may fail to
satisfy unilateral substitutability.
Proof. Consider X = {x1, x2, y} with S = {s}, I = {i, j} where i(x1) = i(x2) = i
and i(y) = j. Student i has a higher test score than student j. Also, s(x1) = s(x2) =
s(y) = s. The school has two slots and the s1 .s s2 with the following priorities:
Πs1 : x1  ∅s1 and Πs2 : x2  y  ∅s2 .
Suppose that the school set the following capacity transfer scheme: q¯s1 = 1 is
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given. qs2(r1) = 1 for both r1 = 0 and r1 = 1, i.e., even if the first slot remains
empty there will be no transfer of this empty seat. Note that the monotonicity of
capacity transfer scheme is satisfied when there is no capacity transfer.
Then, Cs fails to satisfy unilateral substitutability. To see why consider Cs({x2, y}) =
{x2} and Cs({x1, x2, y}) = {x1, y}. Note that y /∈Cs({x2, y}) but y ∈ Cs({x1, x2, y}).
Furthermore, overall choice functions in our setting need not satisfy LAD.
Proposition 5. Suppose that sub-choice functions are q-responsive and capacity
transfer scheme is monotonic. The overall choice functions of schools may fail to
satisfy the law of aggregate demand.
Proof. Consider X = {x1, x2, y} with S = {s}, I = {i, j} where i(x1) = i(x2) = i
and i(y) = j. Also, s(x1) = s(x2) = s(y) = s. The school has two slots and the
s1 .
s s2 with the following priorities:
Πs1 : x1  y  ∅s1 and Πs2 : x2  ∅s2
Suppose that the school sets the following capacity transfer scheme: q¯s1 = 1 is
given. qs2(r1) = 1 for both r1 = 0 and r1 = 1, i.e., even if the first slot remains
empty there will be no transfer of this empty seat. Then, Cs fails to satisfy the law of
aggregate demand. Consider Cs({x2, y}) = {x2, y} and Cs({x1, x2, y}) = {x1}.
Even though overall choice functions fail to satisfy US and LAD, in the cumula-
tive offer algorithm if a contract is rejected at any step of the algorithm, then that
contract cannot be held at any further step. In other words, there is no renegotiation
of a rejected contract.
Proposition 6. Suppose that sub-choice functions are q-responsive. If a contract z
is rejected by school s at any step of the cumulative offer algorithm, then it cannot
be held by school s in any subsequent step.
Proof. See Appendix B.
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When no renegotiation occurs in the cumulative offer process, the algorithm
coincides with the standard agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm.22
Proposition 7. Suppose that all sub-choice functions are q-responsive. Then, the
cumulative offer algorithm outcome under any monotone capacity transfer scheme is
stable.
The standard definition of dominant strategy incentive compatibility, i.e., strategy-
proofness, is as follows:
Definition 17. A direct mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof if @i ∈ I, P−i ∈ P−i, P i,
P˜ i∈ P such that ϕ(P˜ i, P−i)P iϕ(P ).
That is, no matter which agent we consider, no matter what her true preferences
P i are, no matter what other preferences P−i other cadets report (true or not),
and no matter which potential “misrepresentation” P˜ i agent i considers, truthful
preference revelation is in her best interests. Hence, agents can never benefit from
“gaming” the mechanism ϕ.
Theorem 2. Suppose that all sub-choice functions are q-responsive and the capacity
transfer scheme is monotonic. Then, the cumulative offer mechanism Φ as a direct
mechanism is strategy-proof.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In a setting with no capacity transfer, Alva (2104) shows that if sub-choice func-
tions satisfy US and LAD, even though overall choice functions do not satisfy US
and LAD, the cumulative offer mechanism is strategy proof.
5.3 Agent-Optimal Stable Outcomes
In our framework, an agent-optimal stable outcome need not exist.
Proposition 8. An agent-optimal stable outcome might not exist.
22See Hatfield and Kojima (2010).
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Proof. Consider X = {x1, x2, y} with S = {s}, I = {i, j} where i(x1) = i(x2) = i
and i(y) = j. Also, s(x1) = s(x2) = s(y) = s. The school has two slots, each with
a different privilege type t1 and t2. The precedence order is t1 .s t2. The priorities
of each privilege type is as follows: Πt1 : x1  ∅t1 and Πt2 : x2  y  ∅t2 . Without
capacity transfer, the cumulative offer algorithm outcome is {x2}. However, the
outcome {x1, y} is also stable. Since there is no Pareto-domination relationship
between the two outcomes {x2} and {x1, y} and they are the only stable outcomes,
there is no agent-optimal stable outcome in this example.
In the above example, suppose school s uses the following capacity transfer
scheme : if r1 = 1, then qt2 = 2. The cumulative offer algorithm outcome is now
{x2, y}, which is the only stable outcome under the given monotonic capacity trans-
fer.
Even when agent-optimal stable outcomes do exist, the cumulative offer process
might not select them.
Proposition 9. The cumulative offer algorithm outcome might be Pareto dominated
by the agent-optimal stable outcome.
Proof. Consider the following example: I = {i, j, k} where i has the highest test
score and k has the lowest one. There is only one school, i.e., S = {s}. There
are five different privilege types, i.e., Θ = {t1, t2, t3, t4, t5}. The set of contracts is
X = {x2, x4, x5, y1, y3, y4, z1, z3} where i(x2) = i(x4) = i(x5) = i, i(y1) = i(y3) =
i(y4) = j and i(z1) = i(z3) = k. The privilege type specific to each contract is as
follows: t(y1) = t(z1) = t1, t(x2) = t2, t(y3) = t(z3) = t3, t(x4) = t(y4) = t4, and
t(x5) = t5. The agent preferences are
Pi : x2 i x4 i x5 i ∅i
Pj : y3 j y4 j y1 j ∅j
Pk : z1 k z3 k ∅k
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Suppose we have the following monotonic capacity transfer scheme:
1. The first seat, s1, is for privilege type t1 and q¯s1 = 1.
2. The second seat, s2, is for privilege type t2 and initially q¯s2 = 0. However, if
r1 = 1, then qs2 = 1.
3. The third seat, s3, is for privilege type t3 and initially q¯s3 = 0. If r1 = r2 = 1,
then qs3 = 1. Otherwise qs3 = 0.
4. The fourth seat, s4, is for privilege type t4 and initially q¯s4 = 1. For any r1, r2
and r3, qs4 = 1. (no capacity transfer)
5. The fifth seat, s5, is for privilege type t2 and initially q¯s5 = 0. However, if
r4 = 1, then qs5 = 1. Otherwise, it is 0.
6. The sixth seat, s6, is for privilege type t5 and initially q¯s6 = 0. However, if
r4 = r5 = 1, then qs6 = 1. Otherwise, it is 0.
7. The seventh seat, s7, is for privilege type t3 and initially q¯s7 = 0. However, if
r4 = r5 = r6 = 1, then qs7 = 1. Otherwise, it is 0.
8. The last seat, s8, is for privilege type t1 and initially q¯s8 = 0. However, if
r4 = r5 = r6 = r7 = 1, then qs8 = 1. Otherwise, it is 0.
For this example, the cumulative offer process is run with the precedence order
s1 .
s s2 .
s s3 .
s s4 .
s s5 .
2 s6 .
s s7 .
s s8 as follows:
Y Cs(Y )
{x2} {x2}
{x2, y3} {x2, y3}
{x2, y3, z3} {x2, y3}
{x2, y3, z3, z1} {z1, x2}
{x2, y3, z3, z1, y4} {z1, y4}
{x2, y3, z3, z1, y4, x4} {z1, x4}
{x2, y3, z3, z1, y4, x4, y1} {y1, x4}
As shown above, the cumulative offer algorithm outcome in this example is
{y1, x4}. However, it is Pareto dominated by the outcome {y1, x2}, which is sta-
ble. Moreover, {y1, x2} is the agent-optimal stable allocation in this example.
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5.4 Respect for Unambiguous Improvements
The failure of respecting improvement property hurts the mechanism not only from
a normative perspective but also via the adverse incentives it creates if student effort
plays any role in determining the strict ranking of agents according to test scores. As
in most merit-based resource allocation problems, this is the case for both engineering
school admissions in India and also the cadet-branch matching problem in USMA
and ROTC.
Theorem 3. The cumulative offer mechanism Φ respects unambiguous improve-
ments under any monotonic capacity transfer scheme.
Proof. See Appendix B.
5.5 Increasing Efficiency through Monotonic Capacity Transfer Schemes
The following example illustrates the idea that the outcome of the cumulative offer
algorithm under monotonic capacity transfers Pareto dominates the outcome of the
cumulative offer algorithm under no capacity transfers.
Example 2. ConsiderX = {x1, x2, y1, y3, z1, z2, w2, w3} with S = {s}, I = {i, j, k, l}
where i(x1) = i(x2) = i, i(y1) = i(y3) = j, i(z1) = i(z2) = k and i(w2) = i(w3) = l.
All the contracts are with school s. Θ = {t1, t2, t3} where t(x1) = t(y1) = t(z1) = t1,
t(x2) = t(z2) = t(w2) = t2 and t(y3) = t(w3) = t3. School s has three seats, one for
each type of student, i.e., q¯t1 = q¯t2 = q¯t3 = 1 is the target distribution of the school.
Students are ranked according to test scores from highest to lowest as : i− j− k− l.
Hence, the following priorities for each type are derived:
Πt1 : x1  y1  z1  ∅t1
Πt2 : x2  z2  w2  ∅t2
Πt3 : y3  w3  ∅t3
34
The student preferences over contracts naming them are as follows:
Pi : x2Pix1Pi∅i
Pj : y3Pjy1Pj∅j
Pk : z2Pkz1Pk∅k
Pl : w2Plw3Pl∅l
If there is no capacity transfer then the cumulative offer algorithm outcome is
{x2, y3, z1}. Now, suppose that the school has the following monotonic capacity
transfer scheme: q¯t1 = 1. If r1 = 0, then qt2 = 1. If r1 = 1, then qt2 = 2. If
r1 = 0 and r2 = 0, then qt3 = 1. If r1 = 1 and r2 = 0, then qt3 = 1. If r1 = 0
and r2 = 1, then qt3 = 2. If r1 = 1 and r2 = 1, then qt3 = 2. Under this capacity
transfer scheme the outcome of the cumulative offer process is {x2, y3, z2}. The im-
portant observation here is that the outcome of the cumulative offer algorithm under
monotonic capacity transfer scheme Pareto dominates the outcome of the cumulative
offer algorithm under no capacity transfers. Even though agents i and j obtain the
same assignment, agent k obtains a strictly better assignment under the monotonic
capacity transfer described above.
Now, we generalize the observation obtained from the example above:
Theorem 4. If the sub-choice functions are derived from an underlying strict ranking
of students  according to test scores, then the outcome of the cumulative offer
algorithm under any monotonic capacity transfer, Φ(P, q), Pareto dominates the
outcome of the cumulative offer algorithm under no capacity transfer, Φ(P, q¯).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Hence, introducing monotonic capacity transfer increases efficiency by utilizing
seats that would remain unassigned without capacity transfer.
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6 Related Matching Problems with Distributional Con-
cerns
We now discuss some other matching models and approaches to matching problems
with complex distributional concerns to outline the most important differences be-
tween our work and others. For the discussion, we fix a strict ranking of all agents
 according to test scores that is respected at every institution when the strict
priority rankings of different privilege groups are constructed. Also, for each insti-
tution s ∈ S, we fix an initial target distribution of the seats over privilege types
q¯s = (q¯s,tj )
k
j=1 and a monotonic capacity transfer scheme qs = (qs,tj )
k
j=1.
Suppose that for all institutions and for every privilege types, the set of acceptable
students of two different institutions for the same privilege type is the same. Even
for this case, a matching problem with dynamic reserves cannot be reduced to a
college admission problem with responsive preferences because (i) a stable outcome
cannot in general be achieved by splitting each institution into k (number of different
privilege groups) smaller institutions, one for each privilege type and then running
separate assignment procedures for each privilege type, since their capacities change
dynamically in our model, and also an agent may have more than one privilege type
; and (ii) it is not possible in general to eliminate the possibility of capacity transfers
by modifying institutions’ priorities/sub-choice functions.
Alva (2014) studies a matching problem similar to ours. However, in his model,
there is no possibility for capacity transfers. The author interprets capacities of
privilege types as hard bounds. In his model, agents have preferences over institution-
privilege type pairs. In our application, our sub-choice functions are induced from
a strict priority ranking that is obtained from a common test score ranking. Alva
(2014) is working on more general choice functions than the one we use in our
merit-based admission applications. Some results we obtain are similar to his in
the sense that both Alva (2014) and our work analyze the relationship between the
conditions satisfied by the overall choice functions of institutions and conditions
imposed on the sub-choice functions of privilege types. However, our analysis is
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neither a generalization nor a special case of his.
In the context of German university admissions, Westkamp (2013) introduces
a general class of matching problems with complex constraints. In such a problem,
schools may decide or be required to reserve a certain part of its capacity for special
student groups (e.g., siblings, minorities, and so on) and may want to make some
of these reserved seats available to other student groups to accommodate to the
characteristics of applicants. Such constraints are encoded in the overall choice
function of the institution in his model: First, the institution specifies an order in
which special student groups are considered. A student may belong to multiple
special student groups. For each special student group there is a strict ranking of
the students. The institution fill its groups of slots by following the priority order of
each group. The idea in this paper is that how much capacity is reserved for each
group is a function of the number of seats left vacant by groups considered earlier,
starting from some fixed value for the first group to be considered. Each institution
has a target distribution of its slots. An institution initially intends to allocate a fixed
number of slots and has a strict preference for filling these slots according to its target
distribution. If its target distribution cannot be achieved because too few students
from one or more of the groups apply, an institution can express its preference over
possible alternative distributions of student groups by specifying how its capacity is
to be redistributed through its choice of the capacity functions. It is very important
note here that the formulation of Westkamp (2013) implicitly assumes that there
are no specific advantages or disadvantages associated with being admitted because
one belongs to a particular group, so that students do not care about the type of
the slot they receive, but care only about their assigned institutions. Even though
students only care about the school they are assigned to, Westkamp (2013) resolves
the indifferences over different type of seats in a given school by using the order of
precedence in that school. By contrast, the applications we use as our motivation
in this paper, some agents/students do care about what type seat they receives and
their true preferences among the different types of seats of a given institution might
be different from the given precedence order of the institution. To accommodate such
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preferences over school-seat type pairs we use the matching with contracts framework
rather than the conventional matching model used by Westkamp (2013). When
students have preferences over institutions-privilege type pairs the problem becomes
outside of the scope of the problems he considers. Notice that every preference profile
in his setting (after breaking the ties) can be represented in our setting as well but
not vice versa.
Kominers and Sönmez (2013) introduced a two-sided, many-to-one matching
with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches, which
may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Agents care only about their
institutional assignments so that they are indifferent between different contracts that
name the same institution. Each slot of every institution has its own linear prior-
ity order over contracts, and a branch chooses contracts by filling its slots sequen-
tially. They demonstrate that in these matching markets with slot-specific priorities,
branches’ choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability condition typically
crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, they are able to
show that stable outcomes exist in their framework and can be found by a cumula-
tive offer mechanism that is strategy proof and respects unambiguous improvements
in priority. There are significant differences between our framework and theirs. First
of all, they do not allow for capacities to be transferred from one slot to another. In
our setting, each privilege type has initially set target capacities that may be greater
than one. If we consider each slot as a different privilege type and set the capacity
to 1 without the possibility of capacity transfer, we obtain a “specific version” of
their slot-specific priority models because in our applications each sub-choice func-
tion is derived from a strict priority ordering that is induced by a common ordering
of agents according to test scores. For example, if we have two students, say student
i and j, such that student i’s test score is higher than student j’s test score, then for
each privilege type that both i and j have the rankings of agents will be the same
in our setup: i has higher priority than j. In their setting, this does not need to be
the case. Hence, their analysis is neither a generalization nor a special case of the
dynamic capacity approach that we use. Most of our results are similar to theirs in
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the sense that we also show that the cumulative offer mechanism is stable, strategy
proof, and respects improvements in test scores, even though the overall choice func-
tions of institutions in our framework do not satisfy the unilateral substitutability
and the law of aggregate demand conditions.
Ehlers et al. (2014) take two different approaches to analyze controlled school
choice problems. In the first approach, controlled choice constraints define feasibility
of assignments, i.e., they are hard bounds. In this case, they show that it may be
impossible to eliminate justified envy across types. However, justified envy can be
eliminated among students of the same type by their student exchange algorithm.
In the second approach, they provide a new interpretation of controlled choice con-
straints as soft bounds. Our dynamic reserve interpretation can be thought as a soft
bound for controlled choice constraints. With the soft bound view, they describe
school preferences through choice rules that satisfy substitutability and the law of
aggregate demand. It must be noted here that in their model students preferences
are only over schools and each student has one type only, whereas in our setup stu-
dents have preferences over school-type pairs and each student may have more than
one type.
Hafalir et al. (2011) analyzes a model of school choice with minority and majority
students where certain slots at each school are reserved for minority students but
convert into regular slots if not claimed by minority students. They show that there
exists a stable mechanism with minority reserves that is group-strategy-proof for
students. This result is a special case of Theorem 2 of Westkamp (2013).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied a matching problem with distributional concerns where
agents care not only about the institution they are matched with but also about the
contractual terms of the contract with the institution. In other words, we expand
the preference domain of agents from institutions only to institutions-contractual
terms pairs. Each institution can be thought as a union of different divisions, where
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each division is associated with exactly one contractual term. Institutions have
target distributions over their divisions in the form of reserves. If these reserves are
considered as hard bounds, then in the case of demand for a particular division that is
less than its target capacity, some slots will remain empty. To overcome this problem
and to increase efficiency we introduce capacity transfers across divisions when one
or more of the divisions is not able to fill its target capacity. The capacity transfer
scheme is embedded into divisions’ choice functions, i.e., sub-choice functions. The
overall choice function of an institution can be thought of as the union of choices
with these sub-choice functions.
We offer the cumulative offer mechanism under monotonic capacity transfers as
an allocation rule in merit-based object allocation problems where agents are ranked
strictly according to certain test scores. When each privilege has a q-responsive
choice function obtained from a strict priority ranking, the cumulative offer mecha-
nism is stable and strategy proof. Moreover, the cumulative offer mechanism respects
improvement in test scores, i.e., improvement in the ranking of an agent. By intro-
ducing monotonic capacity transfers in the matching with contracts framework, we
obtain a gain in efficiency in the sense outcome of the the cumulative offer algorithm
under monotonic capacity transfer Pareto dominates the outcome of the cumulative
offer algorithm without capacity transfer.
8 Appendix
A. Formal Description of the Cumulative Offer Process
The cumulative offer process associated to proposal order Γ is the following
algorithm
1. Let l = 0. For each s ∈ S, let D0s ≡ ∅, and let A1s ≡ ∅.
2. For each l = 1, 2, ...
Let i be the Γl −maximal agent i ∈ I such that i /∈ i( ∪
s∈S
Dl−1s ) and max
P i
(X \
( ∪
s∈S
Als))i 6= ∅i- that is, the agent highest in the proposal order who wants
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to propose a new contract- if such agent exist. (If no such agent exist, then
proceed to Step 3, below.)
(a) Let x = max
P i
(X \( ∪
s∈S
Als))i be i’s most preferred contract that has not been
proposed.
(b) Let s = s(x). Set Dls = Cs(Als ∪ {x}) and set Al+1s = Als ∪ {x}. For each
s
′ 6= s, set Dl
s′ = D
l−1
s′
and set Al+1
s′
= Al
s′ .
3. Return the outcome
Y ≡ ( ∪
s∈S
Dl−1s ) = ( ∪
s∈S
Cs(Als))
consisting of contracts held by institutions at the point when no agents want
to propose additional contract.
Here, the sets Dl−1s and Als denote the set of contracts held by and available to
institution s at the beginning of the cumulative offer process step l. We say that a
contract z is rejected during the cumulative offer process if z ∈ Als(z) but z /∈ Dl−1s(z)
for some l.
B. Proofs Omitted from the Main Text
• Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. Take a set of contracts Y ⊆ X and a contract z ∈ X \ Y such that z /∈
Cs(Y ∪ {z}). We need to prove that Cs(Y ) = Cs(Y ∪ {z}). Suppose that t(z) = tj .
Then the contract z is not chosen by the sub-choice function of the privilege types
tl, l = 1, ..., j − 1. Note that if any other contract of the agent i(z) is chosen by the
sub-choice functions of privileges t1, ..., tj−1 the proof is done because when another
contract of agent i(z) is chosen at any step, the contract z is removed from the
process for the remaining steps. So, we will consider the non-trivial case where none
of the contracts of agent i(z) is chosen up to the privilege type tj . Since all the
sub-choice functions satisfy IRC, up to privilege type tj , the same contracts will be
chosen from the sets Y and Y ∪{z} by the sub-choice functions Cst1(·, ·), ..., Cstj−1(·, ·),
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respectively. Let us denote the number of unused seats for privilege type tl from the
initial contracts sets Y and Y ∪ {z} as rl and r˜l, respectively. Since t(z) = tj we
have rl = r˜l for l = 1, ..., j− 1. It implies that qstj (r1, ..., rj−1) = qstj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1). Let
us denote the remaining set of contracts after the choice by the choice function of
privilege type tl from the initial contract sets Y and Y ∪{z} as Y land Y˜ l, respectively.
By our assumption we know that z /∈ Cstj (Y˜ j−1, qstj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1) and Y˜ j−1 =
Y j−1∪{z}. By the IRC of the sub-choice function Cstj (·, ·), we obtain C(Y˜ j−1, qstj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1) =
Cstj (Y
j−1, qstj (r1, ..., rj−1). Also, rj = r˜j . If i(z) ∈ i[Cstj (Y˜ j−1, qstj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1))], then
the contract z is removed from the process. Otherwise, we have Y˜ j = Y j ∪ {z}.
Since qstj+1(r1, ..., rj) = q
s
tj+1(r˜1, ..., r˜j) the same argument holds for the privilege
type tj+1. By proceeding in the same fashion we obtain C(Y˜ l, qstj (r˜1, ..., r˜l)) =
Cstj (Y
l, qstj (r1, ..., rl)) for all l = 1, ..., k. Hence, we have C
s(Y ) = Cs(Y ∪ {z}).
• Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. Since all sub-choice functions satisfy IRC, by Proposition 1, the overall choice
function satisfies IRC as well. In order to prove that the overall choice function
satisfies WS we take a set of contracts Y ⊆ X and two contracts x, z ∈ X \ Y such
that | Y ∪ {x, z} |=| i(Y ∪ {x, z}) |. Suppose that z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {z}). We need to
show that z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {x, z}). We consider two cases:
Case 1: x /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {x, z}). Since the overall choice function satisfies IRC,
we then have Cs(Y ∪ {x, z}) = Cs(Y ∪ {z}). Hence, by our assumption, we have
z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {x, z}).
Case 2: x ∈ Cs(Y ∪ {x, z}). Let the privilege type of agent i(x) be t(x) = tj
where j ∈ {1, ..., , k}. Then for each l /∈ {1, ..., j − 1}, neither x not z are chosen by
sub-choice functions. By IRC of sub-choice functions since x is not chosen by the
sub-choice functions of privileges t1, ..., tj−1, sub-choices from the sets (Y ∪{z}) and
(Y ∪{x, z}) for privilege types t1, ..., tj−1 are identical. Hence, the number of unused
seats of privilege types t1, ..., tj−1 from the sets (Y ∪ {z}) and (Y ∪ {x, z}) are the
same, i.e., rl = r˜l for every l ∈ {1, ..., j − 1}. It implies that capacity of privilege
type tj qstj (r1, ..., rj−1) is equal to q
s
tj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1). Let Y
l be the set of remaining
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contracts after sub-choice for privilege type tj from the set (Y ∪ {z}) and Y˜ l be the
set of remaining contracts after sub-choice for privilege tj from the set (Y ∪ {x, z}.
Note that Y˜ l = Y l ∪ {x} for all l ∈ {1, ..., j − 1}.
Let Yj and Y˜j be the set of chosen contracts by sub-choice functions for privilege
tj from the sets (Y ∪{z}) and (Y ∪{x, z}), respectively. By the weak substitutability
of sub-choice function for privilege tj we have z /∈ Y˜j . It is easy to see that Y j ⊆ Y˜ j
because otherwise there exists a contract y ∈ Y j (means y /∈ Yj) but y /∈ Y˜ j (means
y ∈ Y˜j). Since each agent has only one contract we have contradiction with the fact
that sub-choice functions satisfy weak substitutability (WS). By the law of aggregate
demand (LAD) of the sub-choice functions we have | Yj |≤| Y˜j |. Hence, we have
qstj+1 = q
s
tj+1(r1, ..., rj) ≥ q˜stj+1 = qstj+1(r˜1, ..., r˜j) by monotonicity of the capacity
transfer scheme as rj ≥ r˜j and rl = r˜l for every l ∈ {1, ..., j − 1}.
By our assumption, we know that z /∈ Cstj+1(Y j , qstj+1). By quota monotonicity
(QM) of sub-choice functions we have z /∈ Cstj+1(Y j , q˜stj+1). Then, WS and IRC of
sub-choice functions imply that z /∈ Y˜j+1 = Cstj+1(Y˜ j , q˜stj+1). By the LAD of sub-
choice functions we have | Yj+1 |≤| Y˜j+1 |. It implies that rj+1 ≥ r˜j+1, and, hence,
qstj+2(r1, ..., rj+1) ≥ qstj+2(r˜1, ..., r˜j+1) by the monotonicity of the capacity transfer
scheme. Also, it is easy to see that Y j+1 ⊆ Y˜ j+1. Repeating the same arguments for
the rest of the privileges gives us z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {x, z}) and completes the proof.
Lemma 1. Take Y ⊆ X and x, z ∈ X\Y such that i(x) 6= i(y) and i(x), i(z) /∈ i(Y ).
Suppose that z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {z}). Set Y 0 = Y ∪ {z} and Y˜ 0 = Y 0 ∪ {x}. Suppose also
that x ∈ Y˜j = Cstj (Y˜ j−1, qstj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1)). Let Y j = Y j−1 \{x ∈ Y j−1 : i(x) /∈ i(Yj)}
and Y˜ j = Y˜ j−1 \ {x ∈ Y˜ j−1 : i(x) /∈ i(Y˜j)}. Then, Y j ⊆ Y˜ j.
Proof. Assume not. Then there exists a contract y ∈ Y j such that y ∈ Y˜j (hence,
y /∈ Y˜ j) and i(y) /∈ i(Yj). Since none of the contracts of agent i(y) is chosen from
Y j−1 removing them from Y j−1 does not change the set of chosen contracts by IRC of
the sub-choice function, i.e., construct the set A =Y j−1 \ {y′ ∈ Y j−1 : i(y′) = i(y)}
and we have Cstj (A, q) = C
s
tj (Y
j−1, q). Now consider the choice from the sets A∪{y}
and Y˜ j−1. We have y /∈ Cstj (A ∪ {y},q). Notice that y is the only contract of agent
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i(y) in A ∪ {y}. Now consider the set A ∪ {x, y}. Since y ∈ Y˜j , by the IRC of the
sub-choice function we have y ∈ Cstj (A ∪ {x, y}, q). This contradicts with the BS of
the sub-choice function because y /∈ Cstj (A ∪ {y},q) and yet y ∈ Cstj (A ∪ {x, y}, q).
This completes the proof.
• Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. Since all sub-choice functions satisfy IRC, by Proposition 1, the overall choice
function satisfies IRC as well. To prove that the overall choice function also satisfies
bilateral substitutability consider a set of contracts Y ⊆ X and contracts x, z ∈ X\Y
such that i(x), i(z) /∈ i(Y ). Suppose that z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {z}). We need to show that
z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {x, z}). There are two cases to consider:
Case 1 : x /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {x, z})
Since the overall choice function satisfies IRC, we then have Cs(Y ∪ {x, z}) =
Cs(Y ∪ {z}). Hence, by our assumption, we have z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {x, z}).
Case 2: x ∈ Cs(Y ∪ {x, z})
There exist j ∈ {1, ..., k} such that x ∈ Y˜j = Cstj (Y˜ j−1, qstj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1)). For all
i ∈ {1, ..., j − 1}, we know that x /∈ Y˜i and z /∈ Yi by our assumptions. Then, by the
BS of sub-choice functions of the privileges t1, ...tj−1, we have z /∈ Y˜i. Also note that
Y˜ i = Y i∪{x} and z ∈ Y i for all i ∈ {0, 1, .., j−1}. By Lemma 1, we know that Y j ⊆
Y˜ j . Also, since r1 = r˜1,...,rj−1 = r˜j−1 we have qstj (r1, ..., rj−1) = q
s
tj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1). By
the LAD, we know that | Yj |≤| Y˜j |. Hence we have qstj+1(r1, ..., rj) ≥ qstj+1(r˜1, ..., r˜j)
by the monotonicity of the capacity transfer scheme.
We need to prove that z /∈ Cstj+1(Y˜ j , qstj+1(r˜1, ..., r˜j)). We know, by our assump-
tion, that z /∈ Cstj+1(Y j , qstj+1(r1, ..., rj)) where Y j ⊆ Y˜ j and qstj+1(r1, ..., rj) ≥
qstj+1(r˜1, ..., r˜j). Also, notice that i(Y˜
j \ Y j) ∩ i(Y j) = ∅. By quota monotonic-
ity (QM) of the sub-choice functions z /∈ Cstj+1(Y j , qstj+1(r1, ..., rj)) implies z /∈
Cstj+1(Y
j , qstj+1(r˜1, ..., r˜j)). If i(Y˜
j \ Y j) /∈ i(Y˜j+1), then by the IRC of the sub-
choice function we have z /∈ Y˜j+1. Otherwise, there must exists y′ ∈ Y˜ j \ Y j
such that y′ ∈ Y˜j+1 = Cstj+1(Y˜ j , qstj+1(r˜1, ...r˜j)). Note that i(y
′
) /∈ i(Y j). Let
{y′ , ..., w′} be the set of contracts in Y˜ j \ Y j such that each of them is chosen
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by Y˜j+1. By the IRC of the sub-choice function, removing the other contracts of
the doctors i({y′ , ..., w′}) from the set Y˜ j does not change the chosen set. There-
fore, Cstj+1(Y˜
j , qstj+1(r˜1, ...r˜j)) = C
s
tj+1(Y
j ∪ {y′ , ..., w′}, qstj+1(r˜1, ..., r˜j)). The BS of
the sub-choice function implies z /∈ Cstj+1(Y j ∪ {y
′
, ..., w
′}, qstj+1(r˜1, ..., r˜j)). Hence,
z /∈ Y˜j+1.
We now need to prove Y j+1 ⊆ Y˜ j+1 . Take y ∈ Y j+1. We know that y /∈ Yj+1.
Then, by QM, it implies that y /∈ Cstj+1(Y j , qstj+1(r˜1, ..., r˜j)). Finally, BS and IRC
implies that y /∈ Y˜j+1 = Cstj+1(Y˜ j , qstj+1(r˜1, ..., r˜j)), i.e., y ∈ Y˜ j+1.
To finish the proof we need to show that r˜j+1 ≤ rj+1, i.e., qj+1(r˜)− | Y˜j+1 |≤
qj+1(r)− | Yj+1 |. By the monotonicity of the capacity transfer scheme we have
q˜j+1 ≤ qj+1. By the LAD, it implies | Cstj+1(Y j+1, qsj+1(r)) | − | Cstj+1(Y j+1, qsj+1(r˜)) |≤
qsj+1(r)−qsj+1(r˜). Again by the LADS we obtain | Cstj+1(Y˜ j+1, qsj+1(r˜)) |≥| Cstj+1(Y j+1, qsj+1(r˜)) |.
The last two inequalities together implies that | Yj+1 | − | Y˜j+1 |=| Cstj+1(Y j+1, qsj+1(r)) |
− | Cstj+1(Y˜ j+1, qsj+1(r˜)) |≤ qsj+1(r)− qsj+1(r˜).
Since the same observations applies to all of the remaining privileges after tj+1,
this observation ends the proof.
• Proof of Proposition 6:
Proof. Towards a contradiction let t′ be the first step a school sholds a contract z it
previously rejected at Step t < t′ . Since z is rejected by school s at Step t there are
two cases to consider:
(i) z was on hold at Step (t− 1), i.e., z ∈ Cs(As(t− 1)), or
(ii) z was offered to school s at Step t, i.e., z = As(t) \As(t− 1).
In either case no other contract of student i(z) could be on hold by school s at
Step (t−1). But then, since z is the first contract to be held after an earlier rejection,
school s cannot have held another contract by student i(z) at Step t. That is,
i(z) /∈ i[Cs(As(t))]
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Then by IRC z ∈ As(t) \ Cs(As(t)) implies that
z /∈ Cs(Cs(As(t)) ∪ {z})
and yet
z ∈ Cs(As(t′))
Consider every step t′′ in the cumulative offer algorithm where t < t′′ ≤ t′ . In each
stage one of the following cases occurs:
(i) a new contract, x, from another student with the same privilege type as t(z)
is offered, i.e., i(x) 6= i(z) but t(x) = t(z) = tj ,
(ii) a new contract, x, from another student with a different privilege type than
t(z) is offered, i.e., i(x) 6= i(z) and t(x) 6= t(z) = tj ,
(iii) a new contract from student i(z), z′ , with a different privilege type than
t(z) is offered, i.e., i(z′) = i(z) but t(z′) 6= t(z) = tj .
In each case and for each step of the cumulative offer algorithm between steps t
and t′ we will show that z is not going to be recalled.
(i) In this case note that both rl and Yl for l = 1, ..., j − 1 remain unchanged.
Hence the capacity of the privilege type tj will be as same as the capacity before
receiving the offer x. Since tj is responsive with capacity qstj , z will be rejected as
it was before the arrival of the contract x since now competition for slots is higher.
(ii) There are several sub-cases to consider in this case. If the contract x is
chosen by a sub-choice function of a privilege tl where l > j then the contract z
will be rejected again since the capacity of the privilege type tj and all the chosen
contracts Yk where k < j will be the same. If the contract x is chosen by any
privilege type tl where l < j, the number of unused seats for all the privileges after
the privilege tl will be weakly smaller. By the monotonicity of capacity transfer
scheme, the capacity of the privilege type tj will be weakly smaller. Note that the
contract x cannot be the contract of any student whose contract is on hold at the
privilege type tj by the dynamics of the cumulative offer algorithm. Finally, if the
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contract x is not chosen by any of privileges, then by the IRC of the overall choice
function z will be rejected.
(iii) For this case there are several cases to consider as well. If z′ is not chosen
by any privileges by the IRC of the overall choice function z will be rejected. If
z
′ is chosen by the privilege t(z′) = tl where l < j, then the contract z will be
removed from the process by the definition of our choice function and, hence, z will
be rejected again. If z′ is chosen by a privilege t(z′) = tl where l > j, then neither
the number of unused seats rk where k < j nor the set of chosen contracts Yk where
k < j changes. Privilege type tj will have the same capacity as it had before the
arrival of z′ . Therefore, z will be rejected.
Hence it contradicts with z ∈ Cs(As(t′)).
• Proof of Proposition 7:
Proof. Let Y be the outcome of the cumulative offer algorithm. Since agents/students
only offer their acceptable contracts during the cumulative offer process we have
Ci(Y ) = Yi for all i ∈ I. Towards a desired contradiction suppose that Y is not
stable. Then, there must exist a school s ∈ S and a set of blocking contracts
Z 6= Cs(Y ) such that Z = Cs(Y ∪ Z) and Zi = Ci(Y ∪ Z) for all i ∈ i(Z). Con-
sider an agent/student j ∈ i(Z) where ZjP jYj . By the definition of the cumulative
offer algorithm agent j must have offered contract Zj before offering the contract
Yj . Since Zj /∈ Y then Zj must have been rejected at some step of the cumulative
offer process. It holds for every agent whose more preferred contract in Y com-
pared to their contract in Z. So, there is a step t of the cumulative offer process in
which (Y ∪Z) ⊆ As(t). By Proposition 6, a rejected contract during the cumulative
offer algorithm can not be on hold at a further step under monotone capacity trans-
fer scheme, i.e., there is no renegotiation. It contradicts with our assumption that
Z = Cs(Y ∪ Z).
• Proof of Theorem 2:
Proof. Let  be the strict priority ranking of agents according to test scores. The
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priority ranking of each privilege type tj (j = 1, ..., k) at each institution s ∈ S, stj ,
is derived from . Each sub-choice function of privilege type tj at institution s ∈ S
is induced by the priority order stj . In other words, Cstj (Y j−1, qstj (r1, ..., rj−1)) =
Cstj (Y
j−1, qstj (r1, ..., rj−1) |stj ). Note that each sub-choice function is q-responsive.
Fix an agent i ∈ I. Consider the following proposal order Γ such that for all
l = 1, 2, ...
jΓlk ⇐⇒ j  k for all j, k 6= i
jΓli for all j 6= i
that is, the order obtained from  by moving agent i to the bottom of each
linear order Γl. By the order-independence of the cumulative offer process result of
Hirata and Kasuya (2014) no matter which proposal order we choose, outcome of
the cumulative offer process will be the same since overall choice functions satisfy
the BS and IRC conditions in our setting.
Claim 1 : Suppose that agent i obtains contract x from the cumulative offer
algorithm when he submits preference P i : z1P iz2P i...znP ixP i... . If agent i submits
the preference P˜ i : xP˜ i∅i, then she obtains contract x in the cumulative offer process.
Proof of Claim 1 : Consider two different problems that are the same ex-
cept agent i’s preference and also consider two different cumulative offer processes
associated with these two different problems: In the first problem agent i submits
preference P i and in the other one she submits P˜ i. Let X be the outcome of the
cumulative offer algorithm if we exclude agent i from both of the problems, i.e., X
is the set of contracts that are on hold by institutions before agent i proposes a
contract in both problems. Note that agent i is the last agent to propose a contract
according to proposal order Γ. In the cumulative offer process where she submits
the preference P i since she obtains the contract x all the contracts he prefers to x
according to P i are rejected, i.e., z1, z2,...,zn are all rejected. However, note that
when she offers these contracts rejection cycles that return back to agent i occur.
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Note that there are two possible ways for a contract that are currently on hold
in privilege type tj at institution s to be rejected as a result of a rejection chain:
(i) Current capacity of a privilege type is full, the rejected contract belongs to the
lowest scored agent among the agents whose contracts are currently on hold at that
privilege type and some other agent who has a higher score offers a contract to that
privilege type, and (ii) Contracts of some other agents are chosen to be on hold
in the privilege types that are considered before the privilege type tj so that the
number of unassigned slots in privilege types t1,...,tj−1 decreases, and as a result the
capacity of privilege type tj decreases by the monotonicity of the capacity transfer
scheme.
Suppose agent i offers z1 to institution s(z1) in privilege type t(z1). Note that
for z1 to get rejected capacity of privilege type t(z1) must be exhausted when agent i
offers z1 because otherwise z1 would be accepted and the cumulative offer algorithm
would terminate as agent i is the last agent to propose according to Γ . There are
two possible ways for z1 to be rejected:
(1) agent i has a lower score than the lowest scored agent whose contract is
currently on hold in privilege type t(z1) at s(z1). If this is the case z1 is automatically
rejected.
(2) agent i has higher score than some agents whose contracts are currently on in
privilege type t(z1) at s(z1). Upon arrival of z1 the contract of lowest scored agent,
call it y, will be rejected. Agent i has higher score than agent i(y). Then, agent
i(y) offers her next best contract and starts a rejection chain. In the last stage of
the rejection chain a contract from some agent must be accepted in institution s(z1)
in one of privilege types which is considered earlier than t(z1), so that by monotone
capacity transfer scheme capacity of privilege type t(z1) is decreased and z1 gets
rejected. During the rejection cycle, until it reaches to institution s(z1), capacities in
every privilege type in every institution other than s(z1) remain unchanged because
otherwise the rejection chain would not reach to institution s(z1). So, if s(z1) 6= s(x),
then capacities of privilege types in s(x) remains unchanged. Also, note that if
s(z1) = s(x), then the capacity of t(x) either remains the same or decreases. In this
49
scenario one should note that if a contract replace another one during the choice
procedure it means the newly offered contract must be associated with agent whose
score is higher than the agent which has the replaced contract.
Since z1, z2, ..., zn are all rejected, one of the two ways should occur for each
contract zl, l = 1, ..., n.
Let the privilege type associated with contract x is tj = t(x). In the first problem,
due to rejection cycles some other agents might propose some additional contracts
to privilege types t1,t2,..., and tj−1 to institution s(x). Since sub-choice functions
of privilege types are all q-responsive following test scores and the capacity transfer
scheme is monotonic, capacity of privilege type tj in institution s(x) weakly decreases
as agent i continues to propose her contracts z1, ..., zn. Also, the score of the agent
who has minimum scored contract among the ones that are currently on hold in
privilege type t(x) weakly increases. However, we know that contract x is chosen in
this scenario.
Now, consider the cumulative offer process where agent i finds contract x accept-
able only. Compared to the first scenario privilege type tj has weakly more slots and
score of the agent who is associated with the minimum scored contract weakly lower.
Therefore, if x is chosen by s(x) for privilege type tj in the first scenario, then it
must be chosen by s(x) for privilege type tj in the second scenario. This completes
the proof of the claim.
The above claim basically says that if any agent wants contract x to be chosen
and if it is possible by submitting some preference, then she can do it by truncating
her preferences such that she finds only contract x acceptable. By Proposition 6
we know that if each sub-choice function is q-responsive then the cumulative offer
process collapses to agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, i.e., a rejected
contract at some step of the cumulative offer algorithm can not be on hold at a further
step of the algorithm. Since the agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is
immune to truncation strategies, this observation completes the proof.
• Proof of Theorem 3:
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Proof. Fix a student i and let ′ be an unambiguous improvement for student i over
.
We will first consider the outcome of the cumulative offer mechanism under a
monotone capacity transfer when the sub-choice functions for each school are induced
from strict priority rankings ′t1 ,
′
t2 , ...,
′
tk
, respectively. Recall that by Remark 1,
the order of students making offers has no impact on the outcome of the cumula-
tive offer algorithm. Therefore, we can obtain the outcome of the cumulative offer
algorithm when the strict ranking of students according to test scores is ′ : First,
entirely ignore student i and run the cumulative offer algorithm until it stops. Let
X
′ be the resulting set of contracts. At this point, student i makes an offer for
her first-choice contract x1. His offer may cause a chain of rejections, which may
eventually cause contract x1 to be rejected as well. If that happens, student i makes
an offer for his second choice x2, which may cause another chain of rejections, and
so on. Let this process terminate after student i makes an offer for his lth choice
contract xl. There may still be a chain of rejections after this offer, but it does not
reach student i again. Hence, student i receives his lth choice under ΦCOM (′).
Next consider the outcome of the cumulative offer mechanism under the same
monotone capacity transfer when the sub-choice functions for each school are induced
from strict priority rankings t1 ,t2 , ...,tk , respectively. Initially entirely ignore
student i and run the cumulative offer algorithm until it stops. Since the only
difference between the two scenarios is the standing of student i in the priority list,
X
′ will again be the resulting set of contracts. Next, student i makes an offer for her
first-choice contract x1. Since ′ is an unambiguous improvement for student i over
, precisely the same sequence of rejections will take place until he makes an offer
for her lth choice contract xl. Therefore, student i cannot receive a better contract
than his lth choice under ΦCOM () even though she can receive a worse contract
than her lth choice if the rejection chain returns back to her.
• Proof of Theorem 4:
Proof. Consider two problems (I, S, P |I|,, (q¯stj )s∈S) and (I, S, P |I|,, (qstj (r1, ..., rj−1))s∈S)
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in which there is no capacity transfer in the first one while the second one allows
monotone capacity transfer across different privilege types, everything else is the
same in both problems. Note that for every institution s ∈ S and all privilege types
tj , j = 1, ..., k, we have qstj (r1, ..., rj−1) ≥ q¯stj .
We need to show that each agent i ∈ I obtains weakly better outcome in the cu-
mulative offer algorithm with monotone capacity transfer than she obtains in the cu-
mulative offer algorithm without capacity transfer. Consider the following proposal
order - the strict ranking of agents according to test scores. Let i1 − i2 − ... − in
be the enumeration of agents according to  where i1 has the highest test score, i2is
the second highest test score, and so on. Let I ′il ≡ {ij ∈ I: j < l} be the set of agents
who have higher test scores than agent il . We are going to prove the theorem by
induction on students following the proposal order .
First ranked student according to  obtains the same outcome under both mono-
tone capacity transfer scheme and no capacity transfer. Hence, he weakly prefer the
assignment from the second problem over the assignment from the first problem.
Suppose that x′l is the contract agent il obtains in the cumulative offer algorithm
with monotone capacity transfer and xl is the contract she obtains from the cumu-
lative offer algorithm with no capacity transfer. Assume that for all l ≤ L, x′lRilxl.
We need to show that it also hold for agent iL+1, i.e., x
′
L+1R
iL+1xL+1. Assume not.
Suppose that agent iL+1 obtains a contract y in the cumulative offer algorithm with
monotone capacity transfer such that xL+1P iL+1y where xL+1 is the contract she
obtain in the cumulative offer algorithm without capacity transfer. We know that
q
s(xL+1)
t(xL+1)
(r) ≥ q¯s(xL+1)t(xL+1) by the monotone capacity transfer. Also, by our inductive
hypothesis, the set of agents in (I ′iL+1 ∩Xs(xL+1) ∩Xt(xL+1)) whose contract are not
on hold in the cumulative offer algorithm with monotone capacity transfer at the
step where agent iL+1 offer her contract xL+1 is contained by the set of agents in
(I
′
iL+1
∩Xs(xL+1) ∩Xt(xL+1)) whose contracts are not on hold in the cumulative offer
algorithm without capacity transfer at the step where agent iL+1 offer her contract
xL+1. Then, it means when there are weakly more seats available and there are
less agents whose score are higher than agent iL+1 in the privilege type t(xL+1) at
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institution s(xL+1) her contract xL+1 is rejected while it is accepted when there are
weakly more students whose score higher than iL+1 vying for a seat in the same insti-
tution and for the same privilege type and there are weakly less seats available. This
contradicts with the construction of our sub-choice functions which are q-responsive.
Hence, x′L+1R
iL+1xL+1 completes the proof.
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In the matching with contracts literature, three well-known conditions (from stronger to
weaker)– substitutes, unilateral substitutes (US), and bilateral substitutes (BS)– have
proven to be critical. This paper aims to deepen our understanding of them by separately
axiomatizing the gap between BS and the other two. We first introduce a new “doctor
separability” condition (DS) and show that BS, DS, and irrelevance of rejected contracts
(IRC) are equivalent to US and IRC. Due to Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and Aygu¨n and
So¨nmez (2012), we know that US, “Pareto separability” (PS), and IRC are the same as
substitutes and IRC. This, along with our result, implies that BS, DS, PS, and IRC are
equivalent to substitutes and IRC. All of these results are given without IRC whenever
hospitals have preferences.
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1 Introduction
In the matching with contracts framework of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), Hatfield and
Kojima (2010) obtain the existence of a stable allocation under a bilateral substitutes (BS)
condition. Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2012) then show that if hospital choices are not necessarily
induced by preferences, an irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC)1 assumption is also needed.
Nevertheless, BS and IRC are still weak in the sense that many well-known results in the
standard matching problem do not carry over to the matching with contracts setting under
them. For instance, the doctor-optimal stable allocation fails to exist. Hatfield and Kojima
(2010) then introduce a stronger unilateral substitutes condition (US), and the existence
of the doctor-optimal stable allocation is obtained under both US and IRC. With an
additional law of aggregate demand condition (LAD),2 Hatfield and Kojima (2010) recover
both the strategy-proofness of the doctor-optimal stable rule and a version of the so-called
“rural hospitals theorem.”
Given that many well-known properties are restored by strengthening BS to US or substi-
tutes, it is important to understand the relations between them. While the extant literature
clarifies the difference between the US and substitutes conditions through axiomatizing the
gap between them, such an analysis is yet to be done for the difference between them and
BS. In this study, we pursue this analysis and separately axiomatize the gap between BS
and the other two. To this end, we introduce a doctor separability (DS) condition, which
says that if no contract of a doctor is chosen from a set of contracts, then that doctor con-
tinues not to be chosen unless a contract of a new doctor (we refer to a doctor as new doctor
if he does not have any contract in the initially given set of contracts) becomes available.
We then show that US and IRC are equivalent to DS, BS, and IRC.3
1Alkan (2002) refers to it as “consistency.”
2In a different setting, Alkan (2002) refers to LAD as “cardinal monotonicity.”
3Alva (2014) gives some necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for US and BS to hold. We will come
back to those conditions in Remark 3.
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Hatfield and Kojima (2010) show that US and “Pareto Separability” (PS) are equivalent
to substitutability. By additionally imposing IRC, Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2012) extend it to
the case where hospital choices are primitives. This result, along with our axiomatization,
yields that BS, DS, PS, and IRC are equivalent to substitutes and IRC.4 As IRC is
automatically satisfied whenever hospitals have preferences, all of our results hold without
IRC when hospitals are assumed to have preferences.
As summarized above, strengthening BS to either US or substitutes recovers important
properties. Indeed, it is not only restricted to the ones mentioned above. In a recent study,
Afacan (2014) shows that the Cumulative Offer Process (Hatfield and Milgrom (2005)) is
both population and resource monotonic under US and IRC, and it respects doctors’ im-
provements with the additional LAD. The theoretical appeal of understanding the difference
between US and BS is therefore clear. In addition, our paper has practical appeal as recent
works in the literature (notably, So¨nmez and Switzer (2013), So¨nmez (2013), and Komin-
ers and So¨nmez (2013)) illustrate that the US and BS conditions are critical for practical
market design.
2 Model and Results
There are finite sets D and H of doctors and hospitals, and a finite set of contracts X.
Each contract x ∈ X is associated with one doctor xD ∈ D and one hospital xH ∈ H. Given
a set of contracts X ′ ⊆ X, let X ′D = {d ∈ D : ∃ x ∈ X ′ with xD = d}. Each hospital h has
a choice function Ch : 2
X → 2X defined as follows: for any X ′ ⊆ X:
Ch(X
′) ∈ {X ′′ ⊆ X ′ : (x ∈ X ′′ ⇒ xH = h) and (x, x′ ∈ X ′′, x 6= x′ ⇒ xD 6= x′D)}.
Definition 1. Contracts satisfy irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) for hospital h if, for
any X ′ ⊂ X and z ∈ X \X ′, if z /∈ Ch(X ′ ∪ {z}) then Ch(X ′) = Ch(X ′ ∪ {z}).
4Alva (2014) provides another characterization of substitutability by using different properties, which
are not directly related to the currently used ones.
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Definition 2. Contracts are bilateral substitutes (BS) for hospital h if there do not exist
contracts x, z ∈ X and a set of contracts Y ⊆ X such that xD, zD /∈ YD, z /∈ Ch(Y ∪ {z}),
and z ∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x, z}).
Definition 3. Contracts are unilateral substitutes (US) for hospital h if there do not exist
contracts x, z ∈ X and a set of contracts Y ⊆ X such that zD /∈ YD, z /∈ Ch(Y ∪ {z}), and
z ∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x, z}).
Below we introduce our new condition.
Definition 4. Contracts are doctor separable (DS) for hospital h if, for any Y ⊂ X and
x, z, z′ ∈ X\Y with xD 6= zD = z′D, if xD /∈ [Ch(Y ∪{x, z})]D, then xD /∈ [Ch(Y ∪{x, z, z′})]D.
Less formally, DS says that if a doctor is not chosen from a set of contracts in the sense
that no contract of him is selected, then that doctor should still not be chosen unless a
contract of a new doctor (that is, doctor having no contract in the given set of contracts)
becomes available. For practical purposes, we can consider DS as capturing contracts where
certain groups of doctors are substitutes.5
Theorem 1. Contracts are US and IRC if and only if they are BS, DS, and IRC.
Proof. “If” Part. Let Y ⊂ X and x ∈ X such that xD /∈ YD and x /∈ Ch(Y ∪{x}). We now
claim that x /∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x, z}) for any z ∈ X as well. If zD /∈ YD, then by BS, the result
follows. Let us now assume that zD ∈ YD. Then, we can write Y = Y ′ ∪ {z′} for some z′
where z′D = zD. This means that x /∈ Ch(Y ′ ∪ {x, z′}), and since xD /∈ YD, it in particular
implies that xD /∈ [Ch(Y ′ ∪ {x, z′})]D. By DS, then, we have xD /∈ [Ch(Y ′ ∪ {x, z′, z})]D; in
other words, xD /∈ [Ch(Y ∪ {x, z})]D. Hence, in particular, x /∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x, z}).
“Only If” Part. Let contracts be US satisfying IRC. By definition, they are BS as
well. Let xD /∈ [Ch(Y ∪ {x, z})]D and Y ′ = Y \ {x′ ∈ Y : xD = x′D and x 6= x′}. By
5If xD /∈ [Ch(Y ∪ {x, z})]D, then doctor xD is not chosen. And under DS, he continues not to be
chosen unless a new doctor comes. Hence, we can interpret it as the doctors in the given set of contracts are
substitutes.
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IRC, Ch(Y ∪ {x, z}) = Ch(Y ′ ∪ {x, z}). Let us now add a new contract z′ where zD = z′D.
By US, x /∈ Ch(Y ′ ∪ {x, z, z′}). If x ∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x, z, z′}), then by IRC, it has to be that
Ch(Y ∪ {x, z, z′}) = Ch(Y ′ ∪ {x, z, z′}). This, however, contradicts x /∈ Ch(Y ′ ∪ {x, z, z′}).
Hence, x /∈ Ch(Y ∪{x, z, z′}). For any other contract x′ ∈ Y of doctor xD, we can define Y ′ =
[Y \{x′}]∪{x}. Then, by above, xD /∈ [Ch(Y ′∪{x′, z})]D (note that Y ′∪{x′, z} = Y ∪{x, z}).
By easily following the same steps above, we can conclude that x′ /∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x, z, z′}) as
well. Hence, xD /∈ [Ch(Y ∪ {x, z, z′})]D, showing that contracts are DS.
Definition 5. Contracts are substitutes for hospital h if there do not exist contracts x, z ∈ X
and a set of contracts Y ⊆ X such that z /∈ Ch(Y ∪ {z}) and z ∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x, z}).
Definition 6. Contracts are Pareto separable (PS) for hospital h if, for any two distinct
contracts x, x′ with xD = x′D and xH = x
′
H = h, if x ∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x, x′}) for some Y ⊆ X,
then x′ /∈ Ch(Y ′ ∪ {x, x′}) for any Y ′ ⊆ X.
Fact 1 (Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2012)). Hospital choices are
US and PS, satisfying IRC, if and only if they are substitutes satisfying IRC.
As a corollary of Theorem 1 and Fact 1 above, we obtain the following characterization.
Corollary 1. Contracts are substitutes satisfying IRC if and only if they are BS, DS, PS,
satisfying IRC.
Remark 1. As IRC is automatically satisfied whenever hospital choices are generated
by certain preferences, all of the above results work without IRC in that case.
Remark 2. It is easy to verify that DS is independent of both BS and PS.
Remark 3. By following our notation, Alva (2014) says that contracts (of hospital h)
satisfy “recall rejected talents” (RRT ) if there are Y ⊂ X and x, z ∈ X such that x ∈ Y ,
xD /∈ [Ch(Y )]D, and x ∈ Ch(Y ∪ {z}). Moreover, he says that both RRT and another
condition “New Offer From New Talent” (NOFNT ) are satisfied if the z contract in the
RRT definition is such that zD /∈ YD. He shows that (i) US fails if RRT is satisfied and
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(ii) BS fails if both RRT and NOFNT are satisfied. It is easy to verify that the absence of
RRT implies DS (the converse is not true even under IRC); however, the absence (or the
presence) of both RRT and NOFNT does not imply DS even under IRC.
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